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EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN THE DECERTIFICATION
PROCESS: HOW BIG A HELPING HAND?
ELLEN RUST PEIRCE*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments1 to the
National Labor Relations Act2 in 1947, there was no procedure
whereby employees could decertify their union as bargaining repre-
sentative.3 The focus of the Act when signed into law in 1933 was
on protecting the right of employees to organize for the purpose of
bargaining collectively with their employer.4 Not only did the Act
grant this protection to employees, but it further set forth specific
limitations on employer conduct with respect to the employees' or-
ganizational rights.5
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
School of Business Administration. B.A., Bryn Mawr, 1971; J.D., Duke University School of
Law, 1976.
1. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 80th
Cong., 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976)).
3. Section 9 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976), governs the procedure for electing a
union representative. In 1947 § 9(c)(1)(A) was added to the Act to provide for the filing of a
decertification petition to request an election by.
an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization act-
ing in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees... (ii) as-
sert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being
currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no
longer a representative as defined in subsection [9](a).
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1976). Such petitions are known to the Board as "RD" petitions.
4. Section 7 of the Act protects employees from employer interference, restraint or co-
ercion in connection with certain employee activities and provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all such activities....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
5. Section 8 of the Act provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer-
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Recently the process of decertifying unions has received in-
creased attention' and statistics generated by the National Labor
Relations Board7 suggest that it is an ever increasing phenome-
non." Although to date no comprehensive research has been done
as to why there is an increase in the number of decertification elec-
tions, it has been suggested that employees no longer see unions as
the answer to their problems with management, and that in an in-
flationary period, employees are seeking to cut costs, including the
payment of union dues.' It has recently been proposed that em-
ployee interest in being protected by a union has waned because
big government and big business currently offer respectively the
protections unions once afforded its members and benefits "be-
yond anything that a union would be able to negotiate."10 This au-
thor further submits the proposition that unions have become an
impediment to positive employer-employee relations because of
the adversarial role they are forced to play by the current labor-
management statutory structure. Furthermore, due to statutory
and judicial erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine,"' employ-
ees have achieved a greater measure of job security and no longer
have the crucial need of a union to ensure that dismissals of em-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 157;...
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the
provisions of Section 159(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976).
6. See, e.g., Anderson, O'Reilly & Busman, Union Decertification in the U.S.: 1947-
1977, 19 INDus. REL.. J. 100 (1980); Bellace, Union Decertification Under the NLRA, 57
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 643 (1981); Fulmer, When Employees Want to Oust Their Union, HARV.
Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 163; Krupman & Rasin, Decertification: Removing the
Shroud, 30 LAB. L. J. 231 (1979).
7. Hereinafter referred to as the NLRB or the Board.
8. An analysis of NLRB statistics shows a significant increase in the number of decer-
tification elections held. In 1948 there were only 97 such elections, 62 (or 63 percent) of
which resulted in decertification. In 1980, there were 902 such elections, 656 (or 73 percent)
of which resulted in decertification. In particular, the period since 1956 has seen a dramatic
increase in the number of RD petitions filed. In 1967, 624 decertification petitions were filed
resulting in 234 Board conducted elections. In 1977, 1,867 decertification petitions were filed
resulting in 849 Board conducted elections. These statistics were obtained from the
N.L.R.B. Annual Reports for the years 1948 through 1980. 13-45 NLRB ANN. REP. (1948-
1980).
9. Krupman & Resin, supra note 6, at 232.
10. Seligman, Who Needs Unions?, FORTUNE, July 12, 1982, at 54, 66 (statement of
Professor Fred K. Faulkes, Boston Univ. School of Management).
11. For a survey on the employment-at-will doctrine and recent developments, see
Peirce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination at Will: A Principled Approach, 28 VILL.
L. REV. 1 (1983).
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ployees are effected only for "proper cause."
During a certification campaign by a union the employer has
the right to speak out against the union and to explain to employ-
ees disadvantages of unionization. 12 However, once a union has be-
come the bargaining representative of the employees, the employer
is limited in its ability to suggest that the employees would be bet-
ter off without a union. This results from the employer's statutory
obligation under section 8(a)(5) of the Act to deal with the union
concerning all matters of employment, and the employer's statu-
tory duty under section 8(a)(1) of the Act not to coerce employees
in the exercise of their section 7 rights.13 To initiate a discussion
with employees on the procedure for decertification constitutes a
breach of the employer's duty toward the union representing its
employees. 14 Moreover, the NLRB has generally taken the position
that not only is it unlawful for an employer to instigate a decertifi-
cation proceeding, but also to promote or participate in such a pro-
ceeding as well as to induce employees to sign any other form of
union-repudiating document. 5
Because of the Board decisions in this area employers have
been reluctant to become involved at all with a decertification
drive. A close analysis of Board decisions, however, reveals that
certain employer involvement at some stages of the decertification
process is not violative of the Act. These Board decisions may be
analyzed to identify employer behavior at three separate stages in
the decertification process, at the initiation stage, at the petition
stage and at the pre-election stage. While the Board has held that
12. Section 8(c) of the Act states that "[tihe expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of bene-
fits." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). But see infra notes 105-41 and accompanying test for limita-
tion on this right.
13. Pursuant to § 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), the employer is under
a continuing obligation to bargain with the employees' chosen representative unless he has a
reasonably based, good faith doubt of the union's majority status. See infra notes 221-79
and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
15. Holly Manor Nursing Home, 235 N.L.R.B. 426 (1978); Quality Transp. Inc., 211
N.L.R.B. 198 (1974); Allou Distrib., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973); Consolidated Rebuilders,
Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1968). See also NLRB v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2
(5th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Parma Water Lifter Co., 211 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 829 (1954).
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it is a per se violation of the Act for an employer to initiate the
process of decertification,16 the Board has allowed certain employer
assistance at both the petition stage17 and during the pre-election
period.1 8 At each stage the NLRB examines the employer's con-
duct in light of the protections afforded such conduct pursuant to
the free speech section of the Act's and the prohibitions set forth
in section 820 of the Act.
Confusion as to the employer's obligations to the union during
the decertification campaign and subsequent to the election is evi-
denced by conflicting analyses of Board decisions in this area.2"
This Article will first describe the procedure for securing a Board
decertification election and then will analyze Board decisions in
the three aforementioned stages of the decertification process to
ascertain the permissive bounds of employer involvement. In ex-
amining the limits of employer participation in the decertification
process, particular attention will also be devoted to the acts of su-
pervisors and agents which are attributable to the employer. Fi-
nally, this Article will explore the employer's duty to bargain with
a union during the period subsequent to the filing of a petition to
decertify the union but prior to actual Board decertification. Al-
though there appear to be inconsistencies in Board decisions at the
various stages of the process, it is the author's contention that em-
ployers may safely become involved in the decertification process
at all but the initial stage. This Article attempts to clarify for em-
ployers the degree to which they are allowed to participate in each
of the aforementioned stages of the decertification process.
I. DECERTIFICATION PROCEDURE
Section 9(c) of the Act, which governs decertification election
procedure, provides that an election shall be held upon the finding
that a question has arisen concerning the union's continuing repre-
16. See infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 59-102 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 103-41 and accompanying text.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). See supra note 12.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). See supra note 5.
21. Compare Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972) (election will not be delayed
unless employer committed other unfair labor practice in addition to refusing to bargain
during pendency of decertification election) with Bellace, supra note 6, at 685; Krupman &
Resin, supra note 6, at 238 (employer's obligation to continue bargaining subsequent to the
filing of a decertification petition). See also infra notes 221-79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 31
EMPLOYERS AND DECERTIFICATION
sentation.22 Several factors need to be examined to determine if
the requisite question concerning representation does in fact ex-
ist.23 Key among these factors are the following: 1) the petition em-
anated from a proper source; 2) the petition was supported by at
least thirty percent of the unit employees; 2 3) the petition was
timely filed; and 4) there were no pending unfair labor practice
charges which serve to block the petition.
As to the first requirement, the Act specifies that the decertifi-
cation petition may be filed only by union employees or by an or-
ganization other than the union which currently represents the em-
ployees.25 The employer is not an appropriate party to file a
decertification petition.26
The timing of the filing of a decertification petition is critical.
If it is not timely fied, then the Board will dismiss the petition
regardless of how many employees supported it. First, a decertifi-
cation petition is not timely filed if a valid election has been con-
ducted by the NLRB within the last twelve months for that partic-
ular unit of employees.27 Thus, even if employees become
disenchanted with their union during the first twelve months of its
tenure, the employees may not oust the union prior to the expira-
tion of the twelve month period because of the Board's election bar
rule.28 The purpose of this rule is to promote stability in the bar-
gaining relationship by giving the parties a year free from election
22. Section 9(c) of the Act provides that the Board will investigate a petition requesting
an election to determine the union's continuing status as majority representative of the em-
ployees only if it determines that "a question of representation affecting commerce exists.
." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
23. For a full discussion of the factors determining whether a question concerning rep-
resentation exists, see Bellace, supra note 6, at 648-59.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1982).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1976). See supra note 3. It is interesting to note that
Board decisions have upheld union expulsion of employees who initiated or were involved
with a decertification campaign. See, e.g., Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46, 48
(1965). See also infra notes 191-220 (discussion of supervisors' right to file petitions as
members of a bargaining unit).
26. Section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Act gives the employer the right to file a petition request-
ing an election only in circumstances where "one or more individuals or labor organizations
have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representation defined in subsection
[9](a)." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1976).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
28. Under § 9(c)(3) of the Act, the twelve month period runs from the date the election
was held. However, if the union wins the representation election, the Board has held that
the twelve month period barring another election runs from the date of certification of the
union. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954) (discusses "certification bar").
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campaign upheavals in which to bargain. The union is therefore
entitled to a year during which it has an irrebuttable presumption
of representation. A decertification petition is deemed timely filed
after the passage of a year from the date the bargaining represen-
tative was certified or after a "reasonable period of time' 29 subse-
quent to the bargaining representative's recognition by the em-
ployer. If, however, the employer and the duly certified bargaining
representative of the employees have entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement, then the employees may only file a decertifica-
tion petition during the period between the ninetieth and sixtieth
day before expiration of the agreement 0 or upon expiration of the
agreement. For policy reasons based on the need to encourage sta-
bility in labor relations, the Board has long held that the collective
bargaining contract should serve as a bar to an elections ' and that
a petition for a decertification election filed during the contract is
untimely. However, the contract will not serve as a bar to an elec-
tion after the first three years of the contract if its term exceeds
three years, 2 if it contains unlawful provisions, or if circumstances
have changed substantially during the term of the agreement.3 3 If
the contract is for an unspecified period of time, the Board in gen-
eral has held that it shall not serve as a bar to the filing of a peti-
tion for an election.3'
Finally, pursuant to the discretionary power granted to it
under the Act, the Board has taken the position that a decertifica-
tion election may not be held if there are pending against the em-
ployer charges of unfair labor practices that would interfere with
the employees' free choice in the election.3 5 Even if a decertifica-
tion petition has been timely filed by the proper parties, the Board
will generally apply this blocking charge rule to either set aside the
question of representation or hold it in abeyance until the unfair
labor practice allegations have been heard. The rationale here
29. Keller Plastics E. Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966). The period is determined on a
case-by-case basis and has sometimes been held to be less than the twelve month period.
See, e.g., Ruffalo's Trucking Serv., Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 1549 (1955) ("recognition bar rule").
30. Leonard Wholesale Meats Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1962).
31. See, e.g., Paragon Prod. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961).
32. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
33. For a discussion of the Board's contract bar policy, see Bellace, supra note 6, at
659-72.
34. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 N.L.R.B. 990 (1958).
35. See, e.g., Suprenant Mfg. Co. v. Albert, 318 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1963).
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again is concern for protecting the right of employees to vote in an
atmosphere free of employer interference. It is highly probable
that the employer's unfair labor practices could influence employ-
ees in their choice in the election." The Board, however, has devel-
oped a policy not to apply the blocking charge rule under limited
circumstances. If an employer has refused to bargain with the
union subsequent to the termination of the collective bargaining
agreement and in the face of the filing of a timely decertification
petition supported by a majority of employees, the Board will not
delay the election unless the employer committed other unfair la-
bor practices.3 7 The Board has carved out this exception to the
blocking charge rule because it deems that the filing of a decertifi-
cation petition supported by a majority of employees raises a ques-
tion concerning representation.3
II. EMPLOYER PARTICIPATION IN INITIATION OF THE
DECERTIFICATION PETITION
The Board has repeatedly held that an employer may not in-
tervene in matters concerning the self-organization of his employ-
ees and must refrain from all interference."9 The NLRB's rationale
for adopting an absolute rule concerning initiation of a decertifica-
tion petition by an employer is that such activity would be incom-
patible with the employer's continuing statutory obligation to rec-
ognize and bargain with the union as representative of his
employees.'0 In cases where an employer has assisted, whether by
suggestions or acts, in initiating the decertification petition, the
Board has generally held that the employer committed an unfair
labor practice sufficient in some cases to command a bargaining
order and, at the least, to necessitate setting aside an election if
one has taken place.41 As the following cases illustrate, the concept
36. See, e.g., Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1974). For a full discussion of
the Board's blocking charge rule, see Bellace, supra note 6, at 686-91.
37. Automated Business Systems v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1974).
38. Id. See also infra notes 221-79 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945); Harrison
Sheet Metal Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 1952).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See supra note 5. While the employer owes both a
statutory and contractual duty to the bargaining representative chosen by its employees, the
Board allows the employer to abandon this duty in certain respects once the employees have
initiated the decertification process. See infra notes 221-79 and accompanying text.
41. National Cash Register Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1973), enforcement denied in mate-
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of employer initiation, unlike the two succeeding stages to be dis-
cussed, has well-defined parameters.
The clearest examples of what the Board defines as unlawful
employer initiation of decertification are presented in instances
where the employer recommends such activity and initiates it in-
dependently of any pretense of employee instigation. In Alou Dis-
tributors, Inc.,42 the principals of the company, when faced with
renegotiation of the terms of an expired collective bargaining
agreement, prepared, circulated, and caused to be filed a decertifi-
cation petition. One of the principals of the company and a super-
visor engaged in discussions with employees about what the com-
pany would do for them if the employees decertified the union.
Assurances were made that employees would be granted medical
and hospitalization coverage and would be better off without the
union. A supervisor, with permission from the secretary-treasurer
of the company, called the regional office of the Board, had the
petition typed, asked one of the employees to deliver it, and ar-
ranged his transportation. The petition was executed by employees
upon request by the secretary-treasurer. Not surprisingly, the
Board concluded that the conduct of the company's principals
"constituted an aggravated intrusion upon the self-organizational
rights of the employees guaranteed in section 7 and thereby vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
''43
In another case where the Board found the employer guilty of
initiating the union's decertification, a manager suggested to an
employee that he was interested in having a petition circulated to
get rid of the union. The employee agreed to circulate the petition;
the manager thereupon wrote out the language on company sta-
tionery and handed it to the employee for typing. The manager
contacted the company attorney to find out when the petition
needed to be filed and relayed such information to the employee
rial part, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974).
42. 201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973).
43. Id. at 53. Although the normal remedy for a § 8(a)(5) violation of the type found in
this case includes a bargaining order, the Board declined to grant this remedy due to the
extensive unfair labor practices perpetrated by the union. Union agents had entered the
property upon hearing of the unlawful decertification drive sponsored by the employer, and
threatened the employees with economic as well as physical injury should they withdraw
from the union. Under these circumstances the Board stated that the proper remedy was an
election so that the employees themselves could determine the representation status of the
union. Id. at 56-58.
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circulating the petition. Management further aided in the decertifi-
cation process by actively procuring signatures on the petition. The
Board concluded that this conduct constituted interference with
and restraint of the employees' section 7 rights."
In several cases the NLRB has held that the employer initi-
ated the filing of a petition by engaging in a course of conduct
which had the intended effect of inspiring a decertification peti-
tion. In National Cash Register Co.,45 a union won election in 1970
to represent the company's technical service employees at plants in
three locations: New York, Detroit and Duluth. The alleged viola-
tions centered upon decertification activities engaged in by the em-
ployer at each of the plants and included the following: the con-
vening of a meeting by the employer to urge the employees to
accept only a one year contract so that the employees could decer-
tify the union sooner and thus be able to obtain wage increases
available to the company's other employees; the dissemination of
information concerning the mechanics of decertification, where a
petition could be filed, the percentage of employees needed to es-
tablish a showing of interest, and the ensuing election process; and
the informing of employees during performance appraisal inter-
views of the raise they would have been entitled to receive on the
merit system but which the company would not be able to grant
them because they were represented by a union. In reviewing the
foregoing facts, the Board found that such a pattern of direct deal-
ing with employees over matters concerning their terms and condi-
tions of employment in the face of the union's certification as the
exclusive bargaining agent interfered with the employees' rights to
union representation. The Board went on to state that the conduct
of the employer "although widely scattered geographically ... was
pursuant to a carefully orchestrated plan to sow dissatisfaction
among the employees with union representation for the purpose of
inciting the filing of decertification petitions."' 46 While the Board
conceded that it was presented with no evidence that the company
was actually responsible for filing the decertification petition, it
held that such an inference could reasonably be drawn and that
"the filing of the decertification petition was both the intended
44. Quality Transp., Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 198 (1974).
45. 201 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1973), enforcement denied in material part, 494 F.2d 189 (8th
Cir. 1974).
46. Id. at 1034.
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and direct product of the [company's] misconduct."4  The Board
ordered the employer to bargain with the union.
Similarly, in A.W. Thompson, Inc. v. NLRB, the Board held,
in requiring that the employer bargain with the union, that the
employer had set out on a course of conduct calculated to discour-
age adherence to the union cause. Specifically, Thompson engaged
in conversation in which he placed the onus for the employees' fail-
ure to receive wage increases on the union. He declared that he
would not sign another contract with the union, and requested and
received the signatures of 125 out of 154 employees on petitions
stating that they no longer wanted the union to represent them.48
In certain instances the Board will look beyond the circum-
stances which led to the filing of a decertification petition and ex-
amine the totality of the employer's conduct in determining
whether there has been coercion on the employer's part in the
filing of a decertification petition. For example, in Wanda Petro-
leum 49 the Board looked to conduct of the employer which had
occurred more than six months preceding the filing of unfair labor
practice charges in connection with a decertification drive (al-
though no complaint could be filed for lack of timeliness)50 to es-
tablish that the employer had implanted within his employees the
idea of decertifying the union. The conduct on which the Board
relied was two separate confrontations between a manager and two
employees. In the first instance the manager told an employee that
he would be better off without a union and that if he were the
employee he would get the union out. In the second instance the
manager told a second employee that the employees would be bet-
ter off under the employer's salaried plan, without the union. Like-
47. Id. On appeal, however, the Eighth Circuit held that the Board's inference concern-
ing the filing of the decertification petition was impermissible in light of the record. The
court was particularly interested in evidence indicating that the employee who had filed the
petition had not even been present at the meeting when the employer allegedly outlined
decertification procedures. The Eighth Circuit expressed reluctance in finding violations by
the employer during the performance appraisals because of major disputes in the testimony.
However, the Eighth Circuit did concede that this misconduct amounted to a violation of §
8(a)(1) despite the fact that the court found the Board's conclusion to be "highly specula-
tive." National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1974).
48. 184 N.L.R.B. 119 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1971).
49. 217 N.L.R.B. 376 (1975).
50. Section 10(b) of the Act contains a proviso which states in part: "no complaint shall
issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing
of the charge with the Board." 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
[Vol. 31
EMPLOYERS AND DECERTIFICATION
wise, in Holly Manor Nursing Home"1 it was in the context of the
employer's "massive unfair labor practices, including direct deal-
ings with employees over terms and conditions of employment in
derogation of the union's status"52 that the Board found a general
meeting called by the employer to have the express and overriding
purpose of encouraging and inducing the filing of a decertification
petition. The totality of the circumstances which the Board ex-
amined in order to determine the illicit nature of the meeting in-
cluded the employer's previous bad faith bargaining with the
union, past direct dealings with employees in derogation of the
union's status, past unilateral granting of wage increases, and uni-
lateral changes in working conditions. The Board further based its
decision on the fact that the employer did not, as a matter of gen-
eral practice, hold employee meetings5" and admitted that he had
come prepared to answer questions concerning decertification be-
cause he knew that an employee who opposed the union would be
present.
In connection with the initiation of a decertification petition,
the Board has made it clear that an employer may only respond to
employee questions and may not volunteer unsolicited advice;5
any evidence that an employer's activities extend beyond this
function is regarded as unlawful initiation and a per se violation of
the employees' rights. Even though the employer in American
Sink Top and Cabinet Co.5 called a voluntary meeting of his em-
ployees pursuant to complaints from employees concerning their
representative, the Board found that the employer had been di-
rectly responsible for the filing of a decertification petition by em-
ployees. At the initial meeting called by the employer, a labor rela-
tions consultant spoke on behalf of management stating that the
company understood that the employees were "most dissatisfied
with the union" and that "your company is also most unhappy
with the union, and believe[s] we would all be better off as a non-
union employer."5 6 The labor relations specialist then explained
51. 235 N.L.R.B. 426 (1978).
52. Id. at 429.
53. Although the employer's president stated that the purpose of the meeting was to
discuss problems relating to the employees' work, the Board discounted this statement in
light of evidence that no such meetings had been held prior to the one in question. Id.
54. American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 410.
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the decertification process and embarked upon a lengthy recital in-
tended to discredit the union. A second meeting was held the next
day at which the specialist not only suggested language for a decer-
tification petition, but also exhibited an example of a contract
which had been negotiated with other employees after their union
had been decertified. Still during this meeting, and prior to execu-
tion of a petition, the management representative held out the
prospect of extending health and profit sharing coverages and gave
assurances that wages would "keep up with the industry"57 should
the union be ousted. The Board cited all these factors in making
its decision that "far from being purely informational, the two
meetings culminating in the employee petition had the impermissi-
ble purpose and effect of encouraging and inducing the employees
to register their displeasure with the Union. '58 Again the Board
examined the totality of the employer's conduct even though cer-
tain individual acts did not constitute unlawful initiation. For ex-
ample, had the employer held the voluntary meeting to answer
questions of the employees without interjecting opinions that both
the employees and the employer would be better off without the
union, the employer would have satisfied the Board's requirement
of limiting its involvement to information dissemination.
In summary, at the initiation stage of the decertification pro-
cess the Board has made it clear that the employer may under no
circumstances initiate the preparation or circulation of a petition.
The Board has also made it clear that it will examine the entire
pattern of employer conduct, not necessarily isolated instances, to
determine whether the employer had embarked on a course of con-
duct with the intent and effect of inspiring decertification. And
finally, the Board in examining the totality of the employer's con-
duct has indicated that in ascertaining culpability for initiation of
a petition an employer's conduct will be given stricter scrutiny in
the face of a history of unfair labor practices.
III. EMPLOYER INVOLVEMENT IN PREPARATION, CIRCULATION AND
EXECUTION OF THE PETITION
While the Board has made it clear that employer participation
at the initiation level of the decertification process is per se unlaw-
57. Id. at 411.
58. Id. at 412.
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ful, the parameters of employer participation once the employees
have instigated the idea of decertification are not so well defined.5"
Although one author has stated that the standard which the Board
utilizes at this stage is whether the employer rendered "more than
mere ministerial aid" to employees, 0 the Board has not restricted
itself to this standard. Instead, the Board has applied numerous
standards such as: "the but for test";61 whether the employer's in-
volvement "substantially contributed" to the decertification ef-
fort;62 whether the employer furnished "more than minimal sup-
port and approval";6 whether the employer provided more than a
"mere response to questions";64 whether the employer "did more
than provide 'information' responsive to questions" 65 or finally,
whether the employer "went beyond mere passive observance."66
To further compound the problem, the number of Board decisions
in this area is limited and, because of the nature of the proceed-
ings, guidance may not generally be sought from the Board stan-
dards set forth in the numerous cases involving employer assis-
tance to employees in revoking authorization cards.67 However, a
59. Cf., e.g., Vernon Mfg. Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 285 (1974), enforced in supplemental deci-
sion, 219 N.L.R.B. 622 (1975) (company did not taint the decertification process by threat-
ening to interrogate an employee and following through with the threat); Sky Wolf Sales,
189 N.L.R.B. 933 (1971), enforced, 470 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1972) (a single instance of promise
of benefit and interrogation was found to sustain general counsel's argument that the decer-
tification process had been tainted).
60. Krupman & Rasin, supra note 6, at 234. While this standard was enunciated in one
case, see Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415, 1417 (1968), the Board has not
consistently applied the term in defining lawful employer conduct.
61. Dayton Blueprint Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1971).
62. Id. at 1108.
63. Placke Toyota, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 395, 395 (1974).
64. Shenango Steel Bldgs., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 586, 589 (1977).
65. Royal Himmel Distilling Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 370, 376 (1973).
66. Birmingham Publishing Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1957), enforced in material part,
262 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1959).
67. One article has suggested that the guidelines set forth by the Board concerning
employer assistance in the revocation of authorization cards may be applied to decertifica-
tion proceedings. Krupman & Rasin, supra note 6, at 236. This author does not believe the
analogy can be justfied. The standard for employer participation in the revocation of au-
thorization cards was clearly set forth in the opinion of the administrative law judge which
the Board affirmed in Aircraft Hydro-Forming, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 581 (1975). The test is:
Whether an employer violates § 8(a)(1) of the Act by involving itself in employee
revocation of union authorization cards depends upon the degree of employer
participation in the process. Where the idea of revocation was initiated by em-
ployees, the fact that the employer gives information to employees as to, and
actually assists in, the mechanics of revocation is not violative of the Act if the
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careful examination of Board decisions provides, regardless of the
professed standard used in a given case, certain guidelines on
which employers may rely. Nonetheless, while certain isolated ac-
tivity engaged in by an employer in aiding or assisting the decer-
tification process may not represent an unfair labor practice, when
the same activity is found in conjunction with other section 8(a)(1)
violations, it will be held to be unlawful." For example, a manage-
ment employee, upon request from subordinate employees, drove
them after work to the regional office of the NLRB for the purpose
of filing a decertification petition. The management employee
waited outside for the workers. Although the administrative law
judge stated that he would
hesitate to find [the employer] guilty of statutorily forbidden "assistance"
merely because the firm's top supervisor has "accommodated" some of his
subordinates by providing them with transportation,... [his] declared read-
iness to provide the requested transportation, coupled with his subsequent
[unlawful] conduct, must be considered ... part and parcel of [the em-
ployer's] statutorily proscribed program or plan.6 1
Most employees are unfamiliar with the process of disen-
franchising themselves from a union. Unlike the total involvement
of a union's representatives during the certification campaign, an
incumbent union is clearly unwilling to provide assistance to dis-
employee has the opportunity to continue or halt the revocation process without
the interference or knowledge of the employer.
Id. at 583 (emphasis added). The discussion in this section clearly demonstrates that the
standard to be applied to decertification cases is not so straightforward. See supra text
accompanying notes 49-58. The standard in decertification cases appears to suggest that
assistance, even when employee-instigated, is in most contexts virtually a per se violation.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-66. Furthermore, the Board has held in deauthoriza-
tion cases that the employer may volunteer procedures for withdrawal of authorization cards
to his employees. Brake Parts Co., 178 N.L.R.B. 247 (1969), enforcement denied on other
grounds, 447 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1971). Cf. Schacter & Peterson, Lawful Employer Participa-
tion in the Revocation of Union Authorization Cards, 31 LAB. L.J. 547 (1980)(discussion of
the extent of lawful employer involvement in decertification). On the other hand, the im-
parting of unsolicited information concerning decertification is a per se violation of §
8(a)(1). See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
68. Cf., e.g., KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1967) (em-
ployer-provided assistance to the decertification effort of his employees, in the form of aug-
gesting language for the petition upon request, and not as a part of a pattern of misconduct,
does not violate § 8(a)(1)). But see Texas Elec. Coop., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 10 (1972) (em-
ployer supplied language to be used in a decertification petition while generally pursuing a
course of conduct intended to undermine the union, held unlawful in light of the totality of
the employer's behavior).
69. Royal Himmel Distilling Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 370, 377 (1973) (emphasis added).
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gruntled employees interested in expelling it. Employees are not
generally familiar with the availability of regional offices of the
NLRB7 0 and typically will seek advice from their employer con-
cerning the removal of an incumbent union. Thus the threshold
level of inquiry concerning employer participation involves em-
ployer response to employee questions concerning ousting their
union. The Board has held that the employer may respond to em-
ployee inquiries by directing the employee to the Board and may
inform the inquiring employee about the decertification process.
This general rule is best articulated in the case of KONO-TV-
Mission Telecasting Corporation.7 1 Litigation in the case arose
when a petition to decertify the union representing certain employ-
ees was filled with the regional office of the NLRB.7 2 In its com-
plaint the union alleged that the employer had "'prepared and
caused to be circulated among [its] employees a decertification pe-
tition in order to induce employees' to abandon their union affilia-
tion." ' The president of the company had been approached by a
rank and file employee who wanted to know what he and his fellow
employees could do to get rid of the union. Based on a telephone
call to the company's counsel, the president informed the employee
to write to the regional director of the NLRB. In response to fur-
ther inquiry from the employee concerning the appropriate content
of such a letter, the president gave his opinion of what to write,
using in his response the technical term "decertification." General
Counsel unsuccessfully argued that such assistance went beyond
the grounds of permissive conduct. The Board examined the presi-
dent's conduct in light of the impact it might have had on the free
exercise of employee rights under section 7 of the Ac7 4 and found
70. The regional offices of the NLRB have available, free of charge, a number of infor-
mational pamphlets discussing its processes including decertification. Nevertheless, employ-
ees have difficulty obtaining information concerning decertification unless they know to visit
or telephone the Board. Krupman & Rasin, supra note 6, at 233.
71. 163 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1967).
72. The petition, however, was dismissed within two weeks because it had been filed
within the year of certification and, therefore, improperly raised a question of representa-
tion according to the rule expressed in Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). The dis-
missal was not appealed. See also supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
73. 163 N.L.R.B. at 1006.
74. In ruling that the employer had not engaged in unlawful assistance to employees in
violation of their § 7 rights, the trial examiner, whose opinion the Board affirmed, relied on
American Freightways Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 146 (1959), which stated:
It is well settled that the test of interference, restraint and coercion under Sec-
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that the employer neither initiated nor participated in either the
preparation or circulation of the decertification petition and had
not assisted in forwarding the completed petition to the Board.75
The Board further found that since the information given was in
direct response to employee questions, it was lawful. In determin-
ing whether the assistance rendered to the employees was suffi-
cient to support a violation of section 8(a)(1), the Board correctly
focused on the effect such activity had on the employees.7
The Board has also held that it is not a violation of employees'
rights for an employer to provide a list of employees and their ad-
dresses upon request to employees or representatives of employees
trying to decertify their union. In one case an attorney who repre-
sented employees in a bargaining unit wrote to their employer re-
questing such a list. The information was supplied by the employer
and the union alleged that such conduct was unlawful interference.
The Board found that such conduct did not violate employee
rights, particularly in light of the absence of employer participa-
tion in any other manner with the decertification process. 7 Simi-
larly, in another case the Board found the furnishing of such a list
was also appropriate.7 8 In this instance the initial decertification
petition filed by the employee did not contain the requisite thirty
percent showing of interest. The Board notified the employees that
they had forty-eight hours in which to correct the deficiency. In
order to verify a supplemental petition, the employees checked it
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act does not turn on the employer's motive or on whether the
coercion succeeded or failed. The test is whether the employer engaged in con-
duct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights under the Act.
Id. at 147. The American Freightways reasoning was followed in Exchange Parts Co., 131
N.L.R.B. 806, 812 (1961), aff'd, 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
75. 163 N.L.R.B. at 1006.
76. But see National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974). The
Eighth Circuit overruled a Board decision reached by Chairman Miller with Members Fan-
ning, Jenkins and Penello presiding. The court held that the Board drew an incorrect infer-
ence that the filing of decertification petitions resulted from the employer's unlawful con-
duct, because it failed to properly examine the effect the employer's conduct had on the
employees. The Eighth Circuit pointed out that those who signed the decertification peti-
tion were not present when a supervisor told other employees about the advantages of
decertification and no evidence suggested that the employer encouraged those who actually
circulated the petition. Id. at 193.
77. Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1968).
78. Montgomery Ward & Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 956 (1971).
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against an employee list furnished by the employer.79
Although the Board decision in KONO-TV suggests that in-
formative responses to employee questions concerning procedure
for decertification are lawful, this conduct becomes tainted when
coupled with other types of assistance which such questions fre-
quently generate. A case which the Board has cited several times
in defining unlawful assistance in response to inquiries from em-
ployees is Dayton Blueprint Co.80 An employee81 of the Company,
after telephoning the Board's regional office concerning the proce-
dure for decertification, asked the president of the company for
appropriate wording and help in preparing the document. The em-
ployer not only helped word the document, but had it typed. The
Board found this help by the employer coupled with a remark that
benefits would remain the same8 2 constituted unlawful assistance
to the decertification effort in violation of section 8(a)(1). The
Board also found that the company had provided unlawful assis-
tance by imputing to it the knowledge that an employee had, dur-
ing office hours, used the company car to file the document with
the regional office. 8 In determining the validity of the decertifica-
tion petition filed in this case, the Board examined this conduct
84
79. Id.
80. 193 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1971).
81. Although the employee who initiated the decertification drive and who approached
the company president concerning decertification procedures was a supervisor as defined by
§ 2(11) of the Act, his assistance was found not to be imputable to the company, "since his
inclusion in the bargaining unit would cause the employees normally to regard him as not
speaking in labor relations matters for management instead of as a fellow member of the
bargaining unit." Id. at 1110. The Board then concentrated on the assistance the employer
rendered separately, and found a violation under § 8(a)(1). For a discussion of the circum-
stances under which a supervisor's activities may be attributed to an employer in the decer-
tification process, see infra notes 190-220 and accompanying text.
82. But see El Cid, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1315 (1976)(the Board agreed with the ALJ that
employer assurances that the company would maintain the "status quo," absent other un-
lawful acts, was not an unfair labor practice).
83. The AW, whose decision the Board had affirmed, stated:
[T]he inference is that [the supervisor], in giving [the employee] time off for his
mission [to the regional office of the Board] had received clearance from [the
employer]. It follows that in supplying the transportation used on that mission
and in subsidizing [the employee] for the working time he consumed in connec-
tion with it, [the employer] did so with full knowledge of [the employee's] mis-
sion. [The employer] by this assistance thus invaded the rights protected by em-
ployees under Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
193 N.L.R.B. at 1108.
84. As in many decertification cases, the issue here is not only whether the employer's
assistance violated § 8(a)(1) (the conclusion reached by the ALJ), but also whether the as-
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in light of the effect it had on the employees and concluded that
without the assistance of the company the decertification petition
might not have been filed. An implication of this decision is that
an employer may not provide assistance even when asked if such
assistance lends the appearance of employer approval to the pro-
cess. Because the Board will, when appropriate within the context
of the facts, impute knowledge of employee activities to the em-
ployer,85 the employer has a further affirmative duty to assure that
decertification activity neither takes place on company time nor
makes use of company property.8 To meet this duty, it would ap-
pear that an employer must become involved with the decertifica-
tion process to the extent of apprising employees of the necessity
of conducting all such activity on their free time and without any
company assistance of a substantial nature.
In Placke Toyota, Inc.87 a Board panel88 applied the rationale
of Dayton Blueprint to a case where the employer similarly pro-
vided, upon request, more than minimal support to the petition.
An employee approached a supervisor and requested advice in get-
ting rid of the union. Initially the supervisor simply referred the
employee to the Board, but later, upon a further request to have
the petition typed, the supervisor did so and placed it on the desk
used to distribute work orders to employees, where it remained for
several days. The supervisor then requested an employee to file the
document.The Board panel, citing both KONO-TV and Dayton
Blueprint, held that although the employer neither initiated the
decertification petition nor urged employees to sign it, the em-
ployer violated section 8(a)(1) by permitting the petition to be cir-
sistance is of such a substantial nature as to taint the filing of the decertification petition. If
activity of a substantial nature is found, then the appropriate remedy would be to order the
company to bargain with the union upon request, as well as the normal cease and desist
order issuing from a simple § 8(a)(1) violation of the Act.
85. For further discussion of the imputation of employee acts to the employer in con-
nection with decertification, see infra notes 142-220 and accompanying text.
86. The Board has found illegal assistance and employer interference in situations
where a company, on behalf of its employees, mails material repudiating the union, and
furnishes envelopes, paper or postage for such purposes. See, e.g., C.W.F, Corp., 188
N.L.R.B. 554 (1971); KDI Precision Prods., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 135 (1969).
87. 215 N.L.R.B. 395 (1974).
88. The panel consisted of Board Members Miller, Fanning and Penello. Chairman
Miller dissented in part, stating that the activities of the employer relative to the decertifi-
cation petition were sufficient to constitute a violation of § 8(a)(1). Id. at 396 (Miller, Chair-
man, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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culated as a company document after being typed on company let-
terhead.8 9 The employer lent a clear impression of support by
allowing it to remain on a supervisor's desk, and assisted in for-
warding the completed petition to the Board.90 The Board con-
cluded that:
Although an employer does not violate the Act by referring an employee to
the Board in response to a request for advice relative to removing a union as
the bargaining representative, it is unlawful for him subsequently to involve
himself in furthering employee efforts directed toward that very end. Thus an
employer's solicitation, support or assistance in the initiating, signing, or
filing of an employee decertification petition interferes with the employees'
Section 7 rights.9 1
In several cases employer assistance in response to employee
questions has been held unlawful even if of a ministerial nature
because the Board found that the employer, in each instance, had
implicitly been responsible for instigating the decertification. For
example, when the employer, in response to questions, told em-
ployees the manner in which the petition should be circulated, the
number of signatures necessary to make it valid, and the appropri-
ate language to include, the Board found this assistance violative
of section 8(a)(1) of the Act because of a meeting conducted by the
employer to inform the employees of the impasse in contract nego-
tiations with their union.92 Similarly, in another case93 the Board
89. In its decision, the Board pointed out that there was no indication that the typist
had been instructed to use company stationery and assumed this was done inadvertently.
Id. at 395.
90. Id.
91. Id. Chairman Murphy dissented from the Board and agreed with the decision of the
AJ that the employer's conduct relative to the decertification petition was merely "an ac-
comodation" to the employee and did not constitute a violation of the Act. He stated: "[I]n
my view, the mere typing of a document at an employee's request falls far short of that kind
of 'interference, restraint and coercion' which is proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act."
Id. at 396.
92. Texas Elec. Coop., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 10 (1972). This case posed a particularly in-
teresting issue. The employees had requested that their union representative ask for a raise
of seventy-five cents per hour and not accept less than fifty cents. The representative in-
stead offered to settle for a lesser raise of eight percent provided the employer would grant
the union a dues checkoff clause. No employees were present at the bargaining session. The
employer later convened employees to apprise them of the union's offer and that the em-
ployers' counter-proposal was more advantageous to the employees. The employer then
urged employees to encourage their repesentative to accept the employer's offer. Id. at 12-
13. In response to charges filed by the union, the employer argued that this speech was
protected by § 8(c) of the Act, but the Board agreed with the trial examiner's conclusion
that this activity amounted to bypassing the union to deal directly with individual employ-
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found that the employer's assistance to employees in providing
them with transportation upon request to the office of the Board to
file the decertification petition after working hours was unlawful
because it "assisted [the company's] programmed decertification
maneuver.
'"
The Board is also concerned that a decertification drive might
be tainted by the appearance of approval by the employer.9 5
While the preceding cases examined overt assistance during decer-
tification drives which the Board has held violative of section
8(a)(1), tacit assistance is also a violation of the Act. The employer
must be careful not to give the appearance of approval by allowing
decertification activity to occur in violation, for example, of no-so-
licitation rules during working hours,96 or by allowing an employee
time off to fie the petition.9 7 Other examples of such tacit ap-
proval by an employer which the Board has held taints the decer-
tification petition include: allowing solicitations of signatures to
the petition during working hours; 8 execution of the petition in a
supervisor's office;99 allowing the petition to be circulated bearing
ees. Id.
93. Royal Himmel Distilling Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 370 (1973). The Board found the com-
ments of a spokesman for the employer's non-union shop, who was brought in to speak to
the unionized employees, to be in violation of § 8(a)(1):
[T]hough proffered, nominally, in response to questions, [the comments] were
reasonably calculated to persuade [the employer's] workers that their
[e]mployer's currently maintained health insurance and pension programs,
which his non-unionized.., employees likewise enjoyed, would be continued in
force, and that their wages, like those at [the non-union shops], might thereafter
be raised, should they succeed in ridding themselves of union representation.
Id. at 376-377.
94. Id. at 377.
95. See, e.g., River Togs, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 58 (1966), enforced in material part, 382
F.2d 198 (2d-Cir. 1967), where the Board stated:
[Bly assisting in the preparation of the petition and by permitting its circulation
in part on working time, in the presence of and with the knowledge of supervi-
sors, [the employer] gave employees the impression that the petition was being
circulated with its approval and thus restrained and coerced employees in the
exercise of their rights under Section 7, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Id. at 60-61. The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's decision in this respect
because of insufficient evidence, and not on the theory that the Board's principle was wrong.
River Togs, Inc. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1967).
96. See, e.g., Hermitage Hosp. Prods., 239 N.L.R.B. 216 (1978).
97. Dayton Blueprint Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1971).
98. Id. See also Hermitage Hosp. Prods., 239 N.L.R.B. 216 (1978); River Togs, Inc., 160
N.L.R.B. 58 (1966), enforced in material part, 382 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1967).
99. Texas Elec. Coop., Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 10 (1972).
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the statement "this has office approval";100 or volunteering man-
agement opinion concerning the decertification effort.10 1
In summary, it appears that the employer's involvement at
this stage of the decertification proceedings is not so restricted as
it is at the initiation stage. The employer may, in direct response
to questions, provide information concerning the decertification
procedure and may render a minimal level of assistance, again only
upon request from employees. While the employer may be fairly
confident of not violating the Act by merely answering questions,
the rendering of assistance presents a more difficult area. The
Board has made it clear that the employer may not lend the im-
pression of tacit approval to a petition. Thus, an employer may not
endorse a petition by allowing it to be typed on company station-
ery, by allowing it to be driven to the Board's office on company
time, or by allowing solicitation during working hours. The amount
of overt assistance the employer may lend the decertification effort
is likewise limited. Because of the chilling effect tlhat employer as-
sistance will have on employees, the Board has generally held the
employer's lawful conduct is limited to dissemination of a list of
employee names and addresses and response to questions. Other
forms of assistance at this level will be examined by the Board on a
case-by-case basis with particular attention paid to the totality of
the employer's conduct toward the union. The more egregious the
employer's conduct has been historically toward the union, the
more likely its assistance will be found to be violative. Conversely,
an employer who has a history of fair dealings with the union shall
less likely be found in violation of the Act for similar conduct.
102
IV. EMPLOYER INVOLVEMENT IN THE DECERTIFICATION ELECTION
CAMPAIGN
Once the decertification petition has been filed with the
Board, 03 the proceedings enter yet another stage: the decertifica-
tion election campaign itself.1 Employer involvement at this stage
100. Hermitage Hosp. Prods., 239 N.L.R.B. 216 (1978).
101. Royal Himmel Distilling Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 370 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Vernon Mfg. Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 285, enforced in supplemental decision,
219 N.L.R.B. 622 (1975) (the Board held that interrogation of employees in the absence of
other unfair labor practices did not taint the decertification petition).
103. See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
104. The decertification election is conducted pursuant to the same rules and regula-
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is typically characterized by speeches to employees,105 meetings
during which slides are shown comparing union and non-union em-
ployee benefits,106 and letters to employees explaining why they
should vote the union out.10 7 The limits on lawful employer in-
volvement in these activities are two-fold. First, as in the two
stages previously examined, the employer is limited by his obliga-
tions under section 8(a)(1) of the Act not to interfere with the em-
ployees' right to freely choose their own representative, or no rep-
resentative. Second, the employer may not engage in certain
misconduct which destroys the "laboratory conditions"10 8 neces-
sary to protect the employees' right to a free choice election under
section 9 of the Act. However, at this stage, unlike the preceding
two stages discussed, the employer is entitled to exercise his free-
dom of speech right under section 8(c) of the Act.109 The employer
may now express his views on whether his employees should be
unionized so long as the employer's remarks contain no threat of
tions as any representation election. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976); 29 C.F.R. § 102.69
(1982).
105. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 756 (1980); Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B.
895 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1978); El Cid, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1315 (1976).
106. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980); Etna Equip. & Supply Co., 243
N.L.R.B. 596 (1979).
107. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980); Ranco Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 685
(1979); Grede Plastics, 219 N.L.R.B. 592 (1975).
108. In General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), the Board held that employer anti-
union speeches to groups of employees both in the president's office and at employees'
homes during an election campaign could warrant setting aside an election even though the
speeches contained neither threat of reprisal or force. The Board reasoned that the em-
ployer's campaign went "so far beyond the presently accepted custom of campaigns directed
at employees' reasoning faculties that we are not justified in assuming that the election
results repesented the employees' own true wishes." Id. at 127. The Board determined that
the standard for setting aside an election would be different from and broader than that
required to find a violation during an election campaign under § 8(a)(1) of the Act. It stated:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in
which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as pos-
sible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.. . . [W]hen ...
the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite
laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted
over again.
Id. at 127. See also NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973); Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. 1044 (1978); Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 82 (1978).
For a discussion as to whether this standard may be realistically applied, see Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rzv. 38 (1964).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). See supra note 12 for the text of § 8(c).
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reprisal, force or promise of benefit.110 At the initiation stage and
at the pre-petition stage the employer was not entitled to exercise
this right because a valid question of representation regarding cer-
tification did not exist. There was no question at those stages that
the union did not in fact represent the employers as their repre-
sentative.11 Thus, prior to the filing of the decertification petition,
the employer could not encourage the process as such activity
would be inappropriate in light of the statutory obligation to bar-
gain with the employees' chosen representative.
112
Over the last two decades the Board and the courts have de-
veloped a strict standard for employer campaign communications.
For example, in several decertification cases' the Board found that
the employer's pre-election communications were not protected
under section 8(c) but were coercive under section 8(a)(1) where:
within a few days after the employees filed a decertification peti-
tion for an election the employer promised a wage increase;113 the
employer advised the employees it would be better to vote against
the union because they would receive greater benefits;114 the em-
ployer drew up charts for each employee showing what he or she
would earn as a non-union employee. 5 On the other hand, the
Board has held that a promise by an employer to maintain a medi-
cal plan comparable to what employees received under the union
contract did not constitute a promise of a benefit under section
8(c),11 nor was it a violation for the employer to show employees
110. Id.
111. Until it has been determined that a valid question concerning representation ex-
ists, the employer is under an obligation to deal through and bargain with the chosen repre-
sentative of his employees in regard to all matters concerning their employment. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1976). See General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970). See also supra notes 22-38 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the requirements for raising a valid question concerning
representation.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
113. See, e.g., M.&F. Mfg. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 105 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980); Ranco Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 685
(1979).
115. See, e.g., Etna Equip. & Supply Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 596 (1979).
116. See, e.g., El Cid, Inc., 222 N.L.I.B. 1315 (1976). In El Cid, the Board stated: "We
do not believe that those cases in which an employer makes promises of future benefits to
match a union's promises are pertinent to a decertification election situation ... where the
employer promises only to maintain the status quo if the union loses the election." Id. at
1316. See also Lanmmert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 895 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.
1978) (an employer's statement that it definitely would not cut wages if the union lost the
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specific details of fringe benefit programs under previous and cur-
rent practice in the event a majority of the employees voted to
decertify the union as their representative.1
The Board will not set aside an election on the basis of an
isolated violation of section 8(a)(1) but looks to the totality of the
employer's conduct.118 Although there are no absolute guidelines, it
is possible to generalize to the extent of stating that decertification
election communications will be found to be coercive and not pro-
tected by section 8(c) when: 1) the employer has committed other
unfair labor practices; 2) such communications are rendered imme-
diately prior to the election or 3) such communications convey con-
clusions as opposed to mere information.1 '
At this stage in the decertification process conduct which vio-
lates section 8(a)(1) and is not protected by section 8(c) is viewed
not only as an unfair labor practice but also as violative of the
Board's election rules under section 9(c) of the Act.1 20 Thus,
decertification election was held not to be an unfair labor practice).
117. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 756 (1980). The Board, in finding that this
type of employer communication did not violate § 8(c) of the Act, affirmed the AL's deci-
sion which stated:
Section 8(c) of the Act is completely devoid of meaning unless it permits an
employer to clearly portray its practices with respect to its unrepresented em-
ployees so that they [the represented employees] could decide whether they
wanted to secure unrepresented status. It is not unreasonable to presume the
Union stressed in its pre-election campaign the protection it provided by con-
tract against lay-off, arbitrary discipline, etc. The Company was not promising
to grant the benefits in question.. . . All the Company did was furnish specific
details and comparisons so the voters were completely informed of what they
would gain in material benefits by abandoning union representation, as surely
the Union informed them of what they would gain by continuing representation.
Id. at 760.
118. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 404, enforced, 132 F.2d 390
(4th Cir. 1942), afl'd, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
119. R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 155-56 (1976). See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co.,
250 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980)(the employer's communications comparing union and non-union
benefits were held violative of the Act in light of supervisor threats and promises of benefit;
further, comparison between union and non-union benefits drew conclusions instead of
merely providing iiformation). M.&F. Mfg. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 105 (1976)(employer promise
of wage increase immediately prior to the election held to be coercive).
120. In Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962), the Board first announced the
nexus among §§ 8(a)(1), 8(c) and the "laboratory conditions" requirement of § 9(c):
Conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes with
the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election. This is so because
the test of conduct which may interfere with the "laboratory conditions" for an
election is considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct which amounts
to interference, restraint, or coercion which violates Section 8(a)(1).
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threatening or coercive remarks may be both grounds for an unfair
labor practice charge under section 8 of the Act, subjecting the em-
ployer to a possible bargaining order,121 and the basis for setting
aside an election under section 9.122 However, although a union's
charge that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by his communi-
cations to employees may be defeated because of the protection
afforded such communication by section 8(c), this protection only
extends to the commission of unfair labor practices. Section 8(c)
does not protect an employer from violations of the "laboratory
conditions" requirement set up by the Board to regulate election
conduct under section 9. Thus, even though a statement or com-
munication from an employer during the pre-election campaign
may not be found by the Board to be an unfair labor practice be-
cause it contains no threat or promise under section 8(c), it may
still be grounds for setting aside an election pursuant to the
Board's obligation to ensure fair elections under section 9 of the
Act.
123
In accordance with its responsibility to insure fair elections,
the Board has imposed certain restrictions on pre-election activi-
ties of an employer. Thus, in addition to the unfair labor practice
restrictions imposed by section 8 of the Act, the employer is pro-
hibited from engaging in certain "objectionable conduct" which de-
stroys the "laboratory conditions" necessary to protect employees
Id. at 1786-87.
121. In the face of a violation of § 8(a)(1) during an election campaign the Board may,
among other things, set the election aside and order a reelection, or issue a bargaining order
requiring that the employer bargain with the union despite the fact that the union lost the
election. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The latter remedy is only
used in conjunction with severe violations of § 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id.
122. The Board is limited to the sole remedy of setting aside an election for a § 9
violation and ordering a reelection. Thus, although the Board may order a reelection if the
"laboratory conditions" are broken, it may not order the employer to bargain with the union
unless, looking at the totality of the employer's conduct, § 8(a)(1) violations were
committed.
123. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). In justifying its decision to set
the election aside in General Shoe, despite the fact that no violation of § 8(c) was present,
the Board commented that § 8(c) by its language justified the use of threatening or coercive
communications only in unfair labor practice proceedings without referring at all to repre-
sentation cases. Although it has been argued that the Board's remedy of setting aside an
election in the face of employer activities which fall short of threats, force, or promises is
barred by the first amendment, this argument has been judicially denied. See Bausch &
Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 119.
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in the exercise of their right to a fair election.12 4 In order to consti-
tute grounds for setting aside an election, the objectionable con-
duct must have occurred during the interim between the filing of
the decertification petition by the employees and the election
date.125 Examples of such "objectionable conduct" which have oc-
curred in a number of recent decertification elections include: the
granting of new or additional benefits during the election cam-
paign;'26 the denial of benefits during the campaign;127 telling em-
ployees that reelecting the union will not benefit them because the
employer refuses to bargain with that representative anymore; 28
and the making of conclusive statements as opposed to merely con-
firming information.' 29 Thus, pursuant to section 9 of the Act, if
the employer destroys the "laboratory conditions" of the election,
124. Activities which the Board has held violate the "laboratory conditions" standard
include: electioneering at the polls, see Alliance Ware, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 55 (1950); making
speeches to captive audiences within twenty-four hours of the election, see Peerless Plywood
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953); and telling employees that selection of a union will not benefit
them because the employer simply refuses to bargain with any chosen representative, see
Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
125. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453 (1962). However, an employer's
promise of benefits which occurs subsequent to this period may also be proscribed, even
though it did not affect the election, because it might affect a second election. See Ralph
Printing & Lithographing Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1353, 1354 n.3 (1966). But see Vernon Mfg. Co.,
214 N.L.R.B. 285 (1974), supplemented, 219 N.L.R.B. 622 (1975).
126. See, e.g., Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 895 (1977) (employer for first time imme-
diately prior to an election commenced soliciting employees to present their grievances to
him); Montgomery Ward & Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 956 (1971) (enforcing of a dormant rule which
was advantageous to employees directly prior to decertification election was held to be an
unlawful attempt to influence employees). While an employer's promise of a benefit if the
union is voted out is clearly coercive, a question may be raised whether the granting of
benefits by the employer during an election campaign has a similar effect, particularly when
such benefits are granted without inference of withdrawal if the union loses. Indeed, it can
be argued that regardless of who wins the decertification election, the conferral of such ben-
efits simply makes the employees better off, and does not therefore impinge upon the exer-
cise of their § 7 rights. Yet, the Supreme Court has rejected both these arguments. NLRB v.
Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964). In Exchange Parts the Court held that the confer-
ral of benefits by an employer during an election campaign is unlawful since the employees
will read such action as a suggestion of employer power to withdraw any benefits conferred.
Specifically, the Court declared that "the danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits
is the suggestion of the fist inside the velvet glove." Id. at 409.
127. Cf., e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 956 (1971) (freezing of wage in-
creases prior to a decertification election held to be an unfair labor practice).
128. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
129. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 748, 751 (1980) (The supervisor "did more
than point out factual material, he also made the conclusions for the [employees]." For
example, the supervisor stated that the lowest paid non-union employee made more than
the highest paid union employee).
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the Board will simply set the election aside, regardless of whether
the employer actually committed an unfair labor practice pursuant
to section 8 of the Act.
The criteria for judging employer conduct in election cam-
paign cases differ depending on whether the conduct is being ques-
tioned in a representation case or in an unfair labor practice case.
If the former, the criteria for judging the lawfulness of such con-
duct will be compliance with "laboratory conditions." If the latter,
then the same conduct shall be judged by the looser standard of
section 8(c). Since it is difficult to segregate section 8(c) violations
and hence violations of section 8(a)(1) from "laboratory condi-
tions" violations in election conduct cases, application of these
dual criteria may arise in the same case with respect to the same
conduct.130 This is typically the situation in decertification election
cases where the Board may be asked by the union losing the elec-
tion to both set aside the election and to obtain a bargaining or-
der 3 ' if the unfair labor practices are particularly egregious.
Thus at this stage, the employer's communications with its
employees are subject to scrutiny by the Board in the context of
130. In most decertification cases the union is seeking two remedies: the setting aside of
the election and the issuance of a bargaining order. Normally the two matters will be consol-
idated and the ALT will be confronted with the same conduct in light of two separate stan-
dards (§ 8(c) and "laboratory conditions"). For an illustration of the confusion over the
application of the dual standard, see Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261 (1967), enforced, 397
F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968), aff'd sub nom., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
The trial examiner in Sinclair Co. found that the employer's comments had violated §
8(a)(1) as well as destroyed the "laboratory conditions." The trial examiner recommended in
his order that even assuming the employer's comments were not violative of § 8(a)(1), the
election should still be set aside and the employer ordered to bargain due to the impairment
of "laboratory conditions." The Board and the First Circuit both affirmed the bargaining
order without addressing this point. This is, nonetheless, a difficult area because, to date,
the only appropriate remedy for destroying "laboratory conditions" is a reelection while a
violation of § 8(a)(1) may be remedied with a bargaining order.
131. The union's present right to pursue the dual remedies has not always existed. In
Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954), the Board held that the union was required
to make a choice between the remedial procedure under which it sought to have the em-
ployer's conduct tested. Consequently, the union could not then request a bargaining order
if it chose to contest the election based on the employer's breach of "laboratory conditions,"
nor could it use § 9 to have the election set aside if it contested the employer's conduct
under § 8(a)(1). In 1964, however, the Board overruled Aiello, calling the union's situation a
"Hobson's choice." Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 1280 (1964). The Supreme
Court approved the Bernel rule in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See
also International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 361
(D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 902 (1965); Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
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the protection of section 8(c) and the prohibitions of section
8(a)(1), and pursuant to the requirement of "laboratory condi-
tions" in which the election must be held. This scrutiny is made by
the Board in the context of the totality of the employer's conduct.
In a series of recent cases,13 2 the Board has delineated fairly
clearly between proper and improper employer conduct during the
period preceding the decertification election but subsequent to the
filing of the petition. The standard which may be derived from
these cases is that the employer may furnish details and informa-
tion pertaining to non-union wages, benefits and insurance plans;
however, the employer may not do so in the context of implying
receipt of these benefits in return for a negative vote for the union,
nor suggest the inability to confer these benefits because of the
union's presence.
A pair of cases involving separate elections at the same com-
pany and decided by the same panel of the Board1 3 3 serve to illus-
trate Board thinking on the demarcation of lawful conduct at this
stage of the proceedings. In the first decision, Dow Chemical Com-
pany34 (Dow Chemical 1) involving the decertification of the elec-
tricians' union, the Board not only set aside the election, but or-
dered the employer to bargain with the union. In Dow Chemical
Company1 35 (Dow Chemical II) the Board certified the election
results.
The employer's conduct in both cases was substantially the
same in campaigning for the decertification of the two unions. The
company scheduled meetings at which it used slides to set forth
the details of all fringe benefits enjoyed by the company's unrepre-
sented employees at another plant, set against the schedule of
fringe benefits the employees were receiving under the current col-
lective bargaining agreement. In neither complaint filed with the
Board did the union allege that the presentation was not com-
pletely factual, accurate or truthful. In each campaign the em-
ployer followed the slide presentation with letters to the
132. Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 756 (1980); Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 748
(1980); Etna Equip. & Supply Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 596 (1979); Ranco Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 685
(1979); Hermitage Hosp. Prods., 239 N.L.R.B. 216 (1978); Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B.
895 (1977), enforced, 578 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1978).
133. The panel consisted of Board Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and
Truesdale.
134. 250 N.L.R.B. 748 (1980).




In Dow Chemical II only one letter was sent to employees. It
was limited to describing the election process and to reassuring the
employees of job security should the union be voted out. The
Board adopted the findings of the administrative law judge that
the above outlined conduct did not constitute a violation of section
8(a)(1) nor did it interfere with the employees' exercise of free
choice in the election. The basis of the Board's decision was the
conclusion that the company merely furnished "specific details and
comparisons [of union and non-union employee benefits] so the
voters were completely informed of what they would gain in mate-
rial benefits by abandoning union representation, as surely as the
Union informed them of what they would gain by continued repre-
sentation." ' The Board in particular noted that such conduct did
not violate section 8(c) of the Act.
137
In contrast, the series of three letters sent to employees in
Dow Chemical I went into a comparison of benefits between hourly
and salaried employees including comparison of pay scale, life in-
surance, medical coverage, time off and holiday pay and included
such matters as non-union employees Dow loan scholarship and
education refunds, stock benefit and employee stock purchase
plans. Each letter contained the admonition that "the law prohib-
its us from promising these salaried benefits to you if you choose to
decertify."138 Based on the rationale in Dow Chemical II, it does
136. Id. at 760.
137. Id. It is worth noting that the Board examined this case only with respect to viola-
tions of §§ 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the Act, and not with respect to interference with "labora-
tory conditions". Had the union raised the latter argument as justification for setting aside
the election, § 8(c) would not have been an appropriate or valid defense.
138. Dow Chem., 250 N.L.R.B. at 749. In commenting on the legality of the employer's
letters which were mailed to employees, the AUJ stated that if the letters were viewed in
isolation,
[t]here would be a strong argument that the [employer] was correctly detailing
the existing facts to employees in order that they could make an informed deci-
sion in the election. Carrying this argument further, the mere fact that wages
and benefits to salaried workers were in some respects better than that presently
given unit employees does not amount to a violation of the Act as a promise of,
benefits in light of the [employer's] disclaimer that it could not promise to give
them salaried benefits and in view of the fact it was a factual review of existing
salary and hourly wage benefits.
Id. at 749-50 (emphasis added). The Board appears, for the most part, to be willing to over-
look the inferences which employees might draw from a comparison of union and non-union
benefits, i.e., that the more favorable non-union benefits are being promised, so long as the
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not seem possible that the Board would find the substantially simi-
lar conduct of the employer in Dow Chemical I violative of the
Act; however, this conduct was found to be a violation of section
8(a)(1)"1 9 and destroyed the conditions necessary for a fair election
when analyzed in the context of the company's other conduct
during this period. The Board adopted the conclusion of the ad-
ministrative law judge that the employer, through the actions of
several supervisors, had engaged in unlawful interrogation of, and
promises of benefit to, the employees and had drawn conclusions
presented to the employees concerning the superior status of non-
union employees.1 40 The administrative law judge in his summary
stated:
I have concluded that on the basis of the record as a whole [the company] did
more than inform the employees of benefits currently enjoyed by salaried em-
employer's letters, speeches, or slide productions contain assertions that the comparisons, in
fact, promise nothing. See, e.g., Lammert Indus., 229 N.L.R.B. 895 (1977), enforced, 578
F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1978). However, the Board does not always find that this language pro-
tects employer's statements from the inference of a promise of benefits. See, e.g., Etna
Equip. & Supply Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 596 (1979). In Etna, despite the employer's caveats, the
Board found that the employer had promised a benefit when he prepared a chart for each
individual employee describing the pension benefits the employee would earn if he or she
were a salaried, non-union employee. The Board reasoned:
After such an elaborate presentation, the employees would logically be justified
in assuming this was the pension plan they were being offered or promised if the
Union lost. Put differently, it seems very difficult to believe the Employer would
go to such effort for each and every employee unless it intended the employees
to believe the pension benefits presented no more than a mere possibility.
Id. at 597.
139. Dow Chem., 250 N.L.R.B. at 750. The Board held that the same employer conduct
which had been found lawful in Dow Chemical II was unlawful in this instance:
The direct comparisons between the wages of the nonrepresented carpenters and
the represented electricians indicated to employees the benefits of nonrepre3en-
tation approximately a week before the decertification election was held. I find
the direct comparison constitutes a promise of benefit and an inducement to
vote against the Union and such statement is violative of Section 8(a)(1).
Id.
140. The ALJ. in his analysis stated:
Because of comments made by supervisors in... informational meetings and in
individual meetings with employees in which employees were told, inter alia,
that they would receive better wages and fringe benefits, and would fare better
as salaried employees ... and in light of a systematic campaign of interrogation
of employees, I find that the dissemination of benefits via slides and individual
mailings to employees to be part and parcel of the Company's effort to woo the
employees from the Union, and in this context, constitutes a promise of benefits
and is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Id. at 750.
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ployees. It systematically interrogated employees as to their views on the
decertification election and made the judgment that their wages and benefits
would be better and attempted to "sell" that judgment to employees and
thereby induce them to reject their existing union representation.""
These two decisions illustrate the parameters the Board has
set on employer conduct during the pre-election period. The Board
makes it clear that at this stage the employer may point out fac-
tual material concerning benefits and wages of non-unionized em-
ployees and compare them with the benefits and wages of union-
ized employees even if such information is not solicited by
employees. However, the employer must take care to emphasize
such benefits are not being promised and may not venture any
opinion concerning the advantages of non-unionization. Otherwise,
the employer's conduct will be tainted and subject to sanctions of
section 8(a)(1) and constitute objectionable election conduct.
V. EMPLOYER INVOLVEMENT IN DECERTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS
THROUGH ATTRIBUTION OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYEE CONDUCT
The Board has developed a fairly consistent set of guidelines
in cases involving management participation at the aforementioned
three stages of decertification. An area in which the Board has
been less consistent, however, is that of identifying the liability of
the employer in decertification cases for the unlawful conduct of
its supervisors 142 and of certain employees who are "aligned with
management. ' 143 In particular, members of the Board disagree as
to the employer's liability when the supervisors in question are
also members of the bargaining unit which they are attempting to
oust.144 However, to the extent that these two categories of em-
141. Id. at 754.
142. It is well settled that an employer violates § 8(a)(1) when, through a supervisor, it
prepares, sponsors and presents to its employees for their signatures a petition to decertify
the union which represents them for purposes of collective bargaining. See, e.g., Nassau
Glass Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. 792 (1976); Suburban Homes Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 497 (1968); Big
Ben Dep't Stores, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 1925 (1966), enforced, 396 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1968).
143. If an employee, although not by definition a managerial employee, or a supervisor,
is clothed with apparent authority by the employer, then that employee's involvement in
the decertification process will be attributed to the employer. See, e.g., NLRB v. Proler Int'l
Corp., 635 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2 (5th
Cir. 1959).
144. When the supervisors supporting decertification are part of the bargaining unit,
the Board has generally found that the employer must otherwise affirmatively participate in
the decertification activity to support a claim of coercion. See, e.g., Powers Regulator Co.,
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ployees are deemed to represent management, their anti-union so-
licitation is generally held to constitute an infringement of employ-
ees' section 7 rights which is attributable to the employer 14 and
therefore a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act. To the extent
that such conduct influences employees in the exercise of their
rights, the decertification drive is tainted and the petition for an
election will be set aside. This is no less true if the supervisor or
agent is also a member of the bargaining unit, if the duties which
the employer assigns to such employee cause other employees to
regard him or her as an arm of management.146 A review of the
Board decisions in this area suggests the difficulty of consistent
analysis that these two categories present.
In examining the first category, that of supervisor, a threshold
question on which the Board disagrees is the definition of a super-
visor.147 This designation is critical because the Board has estab-
lished a per se rule under section 9 of the Act that a decertification
petition filed by a statutory supervisor is invalid as emanating
from an improper source.1 48 While section 2(11) of the Act 149 is a
149 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1964), enforced, 355 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1966); Hy Plains Dressed Beef,
Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1256 (1964); Montgomery Ward & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 645 (1956),
enforced, 242 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957).
145. If the employer places employees or supervisors in a position where other employ-
ees could reasonably believe they represent management, the employer will be liable for
their antiunion acts. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Triumph Curing Center, 571 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Texas Indep. Oil Co., 232 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
147. See, e.g., Hydro Conduit Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 433 (1981) (Member Jenkins dis-
sented from the majority concerning the supervisory status of a foreman on which the em-
ployer's liability rested). See also Custom Bronze & Aluminum Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 397
(1972) (then-Chairman Miller dissented from the majority concerning the supervisory status
of a lead'man).
148. Modern Hard Chrome Serv. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1959); Morganton Full Fash-
ioned Hosiery Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 134 (1953); Star Brush Mfg. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 679 (1952);
Clyde J. Merris, 77 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1948). The rationale for this rule is best enunciated in
Suburban Homes Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 497 (1968), a case often cited for the following
premise:
Unimpeded access to the Board could not be in the public interest if it served to
provide immunity to the employer who filed a decertification petition intended
to frustrate and obstruct the collective-bargaining process which the Act seeks to
promote. Clearly, the decertification petition filed by Respondent's supervisor
was but the final step in an unlawful plan designed to oust the Union as bargain-
ing representative of the employees.
Id. at 497. But see Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 55 (1973) (no
unfair labor practice where supervisor fied decertification petition and no evidence sug-
gested that the employer had directed, suggested or encouraged the supervisor).
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starting point for Board analysis of who is a supervisor, the grada-
tions of authority "responsibly to direct" the work of others are so
infinite as to necessitate a larger measure of discretion on the part
of the Board. 150 Typically, members of the Board have disagreed as
to the supervisory status of two categories of employees: foremen
and lead men. In evaluating the status of such employees, two key
criteria used by the Board are the degree of independent judgment
the employee exercises and how his co-employees view the em-
ployee's position. In one case151 involving circulation of a decertifi-
cation petition by a foreman, the majority of a Board panel
152
agreed with the administrative law judge that, "while the evidence
does show that [the employee] exercised certain powers that were
supervisory,153 a preponderance of the evidence fails to show that
he exercised independent judgment in performing these func-
tions. ' 154 In a rigorous dissent, Member Jenkins argued that the
149. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976). Section 2(11) of the Act states:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, promote, discharge, as.
sign, reward or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection
with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id. An individual need not possess all of these powers to qualify as a supervisor. Rather,
possession of any one of them is sufficient to denote supervisory status. Ohio Power Co., v.
NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1950); NLRB v. Edward G.
Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908 (1949). However,
possession of any one of the powers enumerated is not sufficient to confer supervisory status
if such power is not coupled with the right to exercise independent judgment on behalf of
management. NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1967).
150. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1961).
151. Hydro Conduit Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 433 (1981).
152. Members Fanning and Penello concurred; Member Jenkins dissented.
153. The ALJ relied on evidence of taint from one witness, a fellow foreman, who testi-
fied that the employee in question was empowered, inter alia, to assign work, give verbal
reprimands, grant leave requests, assign overtime, handle employee complaints and griev-
ances, report poor production and infractions of work rules, and provide "input" regarding
evaluation of probationary and permanent employees. Among the other evidence of supervi-
sory status considered were the facts that this employee devoted little time to performing
production work, earned fifty cents more an hour than production employees, regularly at-
tended production meetings, and wore a supervisor's hardhat. Hydro Conduit, 254 N.L.R.B.
at 435-41.
154. The AJ, with whom the majority agreed, found that the employee in question
lacked authority to effectively recommend changes in the employees' status or to make any
decisions involving the exercise of independent judgment during his performance of the su-
pervisory-type functions. Accordingly, the employee was found only to be a conduit of man-
agement. Id. at 433. On appeal, the circuit court cannot change the Board's findings of fact
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employees reasonably viewed the foreman's position and interests
as being more closely aligned with that of management than with
that of other employees and that the duties required of him, in-
cluding verbal reprimands and the signing of disciplinary and dis-
charge notices, suggest the status of a supervisor."'
In another example of Board dissension over this question, 150 a
majority of the Board panel1 57 found that the employee in question
was a supervisor and that therefore the decertification petition
which he had filed was tainted. The employee in question was the
senior employee in a workforce of highly skilled employees which
had recently been reduced to three in number from ten. The em-
ployee did not attend management meetings nor was he formally
designated a foreman by management. In holding that this em-
ployee was a supervisor, the Board panel relied on evidence that he
scheduled shop work, assigned it to employees (though only in ac-
cordance with the employee's job classification) and, according to
him, had sole responsibility for the workload.158 Based on this evi-
dence and the fact that the employee in question had responsibil-
ity for time cards, the majority of the Board panel found that he
responsibly assigned and directed the work in the shop and exer-
cised independent judgment. 59 Chairman Miller dissented on the
basis that the employee's responsibility in directing employees was
merely of a routine nature and compatible generally with the at-
tributes of a lead man, not a supervisor or foreman.1 60 These two
unless such findings are without merit in the record. Thus, key decisions such as who is a
supervisor are left to the Board to determine on a case-by-case basis. NLRB v. Big Ben
Dep't Stores, Inc., 396 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1968).
155. Hydro Conduit, 254 N.L.R.B. at 434-35 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
156. Custom Bronze & Aluminum Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 397 (1972).
157. The Board panel consisted of Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Penello.
Chairman Miller dissented.
158. Custom Bronze, 197 N.L.R.B. at 398.
159. Id.
160. Id. In his dissent, Chairman Miller stated:
The lack of day-to-day immediate supervision alone where there are but three
highly skilled and experienced employees following the work plan of the draw-
ings and daily instructions relayed to them from the office does not in my view
justify a finding that the most senior and experienced of the three employees
exercises responsible direction and is, therefore, a supervisor. In such circum-
stances, being "in charge" assumes a perfunctory character which has little or




cases exemplify the difficulty the Board has in identifying who is a
supervisor and suggest the amount of discretion it exercises in a
given case.
Because of the responsibility the Act places on the employer
for acts of its agents,161 the employer is found liable even for acts
of its employee-supervisors in express derogation of its instruc-
tions. The Board has generally taken the position that since the
employer has placed the supervisors in a position where the em-
ployees could reasonably believe that they spoke and acted for
management, the employer must bear responsibility for their ac-
tions.16 2 The rationale for attributing such unlawful acts to the em-
ployer is best explained in a Supreme Court decision 6 s where the
Court stated: "Slight suggestions as to the employer's choice...
may have telling effect among men who know the consequences of
incurring that employer's strong displeasure."' " In a number of
cases the Board has held that the employer has an affirmative duty
to assert a position of neutrality and deny support for actions of
supervisors aiding an anti-union drive in derogation of employer
instructions.6 5 The Board in one case stated that, "[w]hile an em-
ployer need not affirmatively act to protect an incumbent union's
status among the employees, it may not take affirmative action
... to undermine that status." '66 The Board has held that an em-
ployer violates section 8(a)(1) where anti-union activity was al-
lowed to take place on company time openly and evidently without
fear of reprimand.
167
161. 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1976). This section provides: "In determining whether any
person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible
for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or
subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." This definition is incompatible with the re-
sponsibility of a principal for his agent's acts under the common law of agency. The em-
ployer under the Act has a greater responsibility for the acts of his agents than he would
under normal agency law principles. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 15 (1957).
162. See, e.g., Justrite Mfg. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 57 (1978) (employer found liable for at-
tempting to persuade employees to decertify the union when his foreman, despite explicit
instructions to the contrary, aided in promoting the decertification petition).
163. International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool & Die Makers Lodge No. 35 v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 72 (1940).
164. Id. at 78.
165. See, e.g., Daisy's Originals, Inc. of Miami, 187 N.L.R.B. 251 (1970), enforced as
modified, 468 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Rexair, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 876 (1979); Renn-
selaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975).




While the Board has suggested that the employer may absolve
himself from the unlawful acts of his supervisors by denying to his
employees that he supports the decertification petition and
thereby remove the taint from the decertification process,0 8 this
redemption only helps those employers who learn of their supervi-
sors' unlawful acts. On the other hand, the Board is in general
agreement that actual knowledge of such acts by the employer is
not necessary to find it liable. 169 The Board has held that it is ap-
propriate to impute knowledge to the employer of the supervisor's
unlawful acts in a decertification drive.170 Under those circum-
stances, an employer who has no knowledge of his supervisor's
wrongful acts will be found to have violated section 8(a)(1) despite
the employer's stance of neutrality.1 11
Not all interference by supervisors in the course of support for
a decertification effort invalidates that effort.172 The Board has
generally applied the same standards to supervisors as it has to
management to ascertain whether the violations amount to unlaw-
ful interference sufficient to enjoin or set aside an election. The
key issue that the Board should focus on is whether the supervi-
sor's conduct in the decertification process in fact coerced the em-
ployees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. 3
An employer may also be found liable for coercive activities
17'
168. Id. at 255-56.
169. The responsibility of an employer for the acts of its supervisors has been well es-
tablished by the often cited case, International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool & Die Makers
Lodge No. 35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940), where the Court stated:
The employer, however, may be held to have assisted the formation of a union
even though the acts of the so-called agents were not expressly authorized or
might not be attributable to him on strict application of the rules of respondeat
superior. We are dealing here not with private rights nor with technical concepts
pertinent to an employer's legal responsibility for third persons for acts of his
servants, but with a clear legislative policy to free the collective bargaining pro-
cess from all taint of an employer's compulsion, domination or influence.
Id. at 80 (citation omitted).
170. Birmingham Publishing Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1957), enforced, 262 F.2d 2 (5th
Cir. 1958). Such inferences are not drawn by the Board, however, if the supervisor is also a
union member. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text.
171. Birmingham Publishing Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1957), enforced, 262 F.2d 2 (6th
Cir. 1958).
172. See, e.g., Freeman Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 595 (1971), enforced as modified, 471 F.2d
708 (8th Cir. 1972).
173. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1973), enforcement de-
nied in material part, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974).
174. Typically, such coercive activities include statements made by employees to their
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of certain employees even though such employees do not qualify as
supervisors under the Act. 17 5 In making the determination as to
employer liability for the acts of its employees in a decertification
effort, "the crucial question is whether, under all the circum-
stances, the employees could reasonably believe that [the non-
supervisor] was reflecting company policy, and speaking and acting
for management. 17 6 In making this determination the Board ex-
amines the position that the employee in question occupies within
the company in conjunction with his words and actions.17 7 The
Board also examines any steps which the company may have taken
which lead its employees reasonably to conclude that those persons
were in fact acting on behalf of management.17 8 In Proler Interna-
tional Corp. 17  the Board found that there was substantial evi-
dence 18 0 to attribute to the employer certain activities of both a
current and a former employee in the promotion of a decertifica-
tion petition. The current employee invited several other employ-
ees to eat lunch at a restaurant away from the plant. During lunch
this employee voiced strong anti-union sentiments and urged the
other employees to sign a petition to decertify the union which
currently represented them. The former employee acted as a trans-
lator for those employees who only understood Spanish. The Board
found that these two acted as agents of the company and that their
promotion of a decertification petition violated the Act based on
the following factors: the company paid for the lunches; the com-
pany paid the employees for the time spent; the company provided
at least one car to transport employees to the restaurant where the
luncheon was held; and the current employee gathered several em-
ployees in the personnel office of the company to execute a decer-
co-workers promising better economic benefits if the union is voted out, and threatening co-
workers with the loss of their jobs for not supporting the decertification drive. See, e.g.,
Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363 (1978), modified per curiam, 628 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
175. The theory that employee anti-union activities could be attributable to the em-
ployer was first enunciated in International Ass'n of Machinists, Tool & Die Makers Lodge
No. 35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
176. Aircraft Plating Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 664 (1974).
177. Regal Shoe Shops, 249 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1980).
178. Helena Laboratory Corp., 557 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1977).
179. 242 N.L.R.B. 676 (1979), enforced in material part, 635 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981).
180. Under the Act, "findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 29
U.S.C. § 160(d) (1976).
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tification petition in front of the company's attorney. 181
While the Board found substantial evidence in the Proler case
to suggest that the employer was in fact promoting the decertifica-
tion petition, the Board has held in several cases that the mere
perception by other employees that another employee is acting as
an agent of management warrants setting aside a decertification
petition as tainted. 82 Such was the case in Columbia Building
Materials8 3 where the son of a plant supervisor was responsible
for the circulation and filing of a decertification petition. Although
the son denied that he had received any assistance from manage-
ment in circulating and filing the petition, the Board found that
his conduct could be attributable to management in light of the
fact that employees reasonably considered that he was in charge in
his father's absence.2" Even though the son was not a supervisor,
the Board found that his position was superior to those of other
employees. He was paid more and did not have to punch a time
clock. He additionally conferred with salesmen, initialed time
cards in his father's absence and had responsibility for certain in-
ventory.18 5 The Board further found that he was used as a conduit
for instructions from his father to other employees, all of which
lent to his solicitation the appearance of management approval in
the eyes of other employees.186 Because the appearance of manage-
ment approval would have affected employees in their decision to
sign the decertification petition, the petition was tainted as ema-
nating from an improper source. Because a decertification petition
may be tainted by the mere perception by employees that manage-
ment is involved, the Board has found, in particular, that cases
where the petition is circulated by relatives of the owner or super-
visor,1 87 or by employees holding themselves out as aligned with
management, either by word or appearance,188 are violative of the
Act. This is so regardless of management's stance of neutrality.
Once again, it is difficult for the employer to successfully argue
that his position is one of neutrality in the face of these circum-
181. Proler Int'l Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 676 (1979).
182. See, e.g., American Door Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 37 (1970).
183. 239 N.L.R.B. 1342 (1979).




188. See, e.g., Proler Int'l Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 676 (1979).
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stances. The Board then may deny certain petitions which have a
legitimate origin.
By far the most difficult cases for the Board to decide are
those in which the employee involved in the initiation or circula-
tion of the decertification petition is both a supervisor and a union
member. While supervisors are specifically exempt from protection
of the Act because of their alignment with management,18 they are
nevertheless allowed to join a union.190 A supervisor's membership
in a union and subsequent involvement in a decertification drive
then presents the difficult problem of ascertaining whether his
anti-union activities were being performed on behalf of himself as
a disgruntled union member, or on behalf of the employer as a
management ageit.
Although employee coercion may generally be inferred from
the fact that supervisors are involved in encouraging a decertifica-
tion campaign,191 the Board has carved out an exception to this
rule regarding supervisors who are also union members. When the
supervisors involved are also part of the bargaining unit, affirma-
tive participation by the employer in the anti-union activity must
be found to support a claim of coercion. This exception was first
enunciated by the Board in 1956 in Montgomery Ward & Co.,192
where the Board held that an employer could not be found respon-
sible for a supervisor's anti-union statements during an election
189. Section 2(3) of the Act, which defines those employees who are entitled to protec-
tion under the Act, states specifically that the term employee "shall not include. . . any
individual employed as a supervisor." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). This section states:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from be-
coming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject
to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors
as employees for the purpose of any law, either material or local, relating to
collective bargaining.
Because supervisors are not "employees" under the Act, subject to the protections set forth
in § 7, they may not normally invoke the employer unfair labor practice provisions set forth
in § 8(a). Specifically, a supervisor may be discharged for engaging in union activities. In
certain instances, however, the Board has found that a supervisors discharge for such activi-
ties has a deleterious effect on other employees whose rights are protected and hence is
violative of the Act. For a further discussion of this area, see Bred, The N.L.R.B. in Search
of a Standard: When is the Discharge of a Supervisor in Connection with Employees'
Union or Other Protected Activities an Unfair Labor Practice?, 14 IND. L. REV. 727 (1981).
191. See, e.g., Suburban Homes Corp., 173 N.L.I.B. 497 (1968); Big Ben Dep't Stores,
Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 1925 (1966), enforced, 396 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1968).




campaign because of the supervisor's membership in the unit and
his participation in the election.193 In enunciating this exception
the Board gave the following explanation and set forth a two-
pronged test to determine employer culpability:
Statements made by such a [unit member] supervisor are not considered by
employees to be the representations of management, but of a fellow em-
ployee. Thus they do not tend to intimidate employees. For that reason, the
Board has generally refused to hold an employer responsible for the anti-
union conduct of a supervisor included in the unit, in the absence of evidence
that the employer [1] encouraged, authorized, or ratified the supervisor's ac-
tivities or [2] acted in such manner as to lead employees reasonably to believe
that the supervisor was acting for and on behalf of management.'9
One of the Board members9 5 voiced a strong dissent that the
coercive and threatening conduct of the supervisor in question
should be attributed to the employer. The dissenting opinion ar-
gued that whether words intimidate or tend to do so should not
depend on the accidental classification of names on the voting eli-
gibility list.9 6
The Board decision in Montgomery Ward suggests that the
subjective views of the supervisor by the employees as "one of
them" because of his membership in the union is fundamental in
cases of unit member supervisory interference.in a decertification
election campaign. Montgomery Ward is the genesis of a line of
cases determining employer liability for the coercive activities of a
card-carrying supervisor. In a case arising shortly after the Mont-
gomery Ward decision, Birmingham Publishing Co.,197 the Board
further defined employer culpability through strict agency law
principles.91 In this case, the Board found the employer liable for
193. Although the Board found that the supervisor's anti-union activities could not be
attributed to his employer because of his participation in the election, the Board did find
that such statements could be used in considering whether the discharge of two employees
violated § 8(a)(3). In other words, despite the supervisor's eligibility to vote in the election,
the Board held that his supervisory status could be considered in determining whether his
knowledge and attitude could be imputed to his employer in determining the motivation for
the discharges. Id.
194. Id. at 647.
195. Member Peterson.
196. Montgomery Ward & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 645, 655 (1956), enforced, 242 F.2d 497
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957).
197. 118 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1957), modified, 262 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1959).
198. The Board stated:
While it is true that agency cannot be established through the statements of an
alleged agent alone, a principal's consent with respect to an agency relationship
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a unit member supervisor's decertification activities because the
employer failed to disavow his activities. The Board concluded
that the employer's shop was so small that knowledge of the super-
visor's activity in making promises and rewards in return for signa-
tures on decertification petitions must be inferred.1 99 To support
its decision the Board noted evidence that the supervisor used
company time, property and material, and was not remonstrated
for so doing, while a pro-union advocate was discharged for similar
conduct. Nonetheless, in another case relying on Montgomery
Ward, Breckenridge Gasoline Co.,200 the Board found that an em-
ployer was not responsible for his supervisor's anti-union activities
because of the employer's belief that the employee was not a su-
pervisor and because of the latter's inclusion in the unit. Thus, in
this instance the Board said the failure of the employer to disavow
the supervisor's conduct could not be considered evidence of au-
thorization or ratification.0 1 In its decision the Board made it clear
that a supervisor's acts would not be attributed to his employer
even though the supervisor held himself out to other employees as
an arm of management.20 2 Again, a strongly worded dissent by two
Board members in the Breckenridge case shows the conflict among
the Board over this issue. Members Jenkins and Fanning, although
acknowledging the validity of Montgomery Ward in certain cir-
cumstances, stated that the principles of respondeat superior
should apply20 3 and suggested that the presumption is always that
supervisors are aligned with management regardless of union affili-
ation.204 This presumption is directly opposite to that stated in
Montgomery Ward.20 5 The dissenting members further suggested
either by way of authorization or ratification may be manifested by conduct and
sometimes even by passive acquiescence, as well as by words. And an individ-
ual's authority to act as an agent in any given manner will be implied, therefore,
whenever the conduct of the principal is such as to demonstrate that he actually
intended to confer such authority.
Id. at 1381.
199. Id. at 1382.
200. 127 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1960).
201. Id. at 1464.
202. Id. at 1463.
203. But see supra note 169 (employee anti-union conduct may be imputed to em-
ployer though the respondeat superior test for imputing employee conduct may not be
strictly met).
204. Breckenridge, 127 N.L.R.B. at 1468.
205. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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that a unit member supervisor must indicate to the other employ-
ees that he is acting in his individual capacity.10 Montgomery
Ward required no such declaration.
In the next case heard by the Board addressing this issue, Ro-
man Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, °7 a Board panel consisting of
Members Fanning, Jenkins, and Penello found both the filing of a
decertification petition and the solicitation of employee signatures
in support of the petition by statutory supervisors who were unit
members, attributable to the employer.20 8 Although the factual ba-
sis of the case when compared to the decision reached therein does
raise a serious question concerning the vitality of Montgomery
Ward, the Board neither specifically overruled Montgomery Ward
nor addressed the Montgomery Ward line of cases in its
decision.209
The succeeding two cases210 in the progression each found the
employer responsible for the actions of union member supervisors
in connection with a decertification campaign. The Board's ration-
ale, in each respectively, was that the employees would have rea-
sonable cause to believe that the supervisor was acting for and on
behalf of the company,21 and that the employee had demonstrated
an especially close relationship with management.2 2
Although the exception enunciated by the Board in Montgom-
ery Ward appeared to be all but snuffed out, it was emphatically
revived by the Board 213 in the recent case of Times Herald, Inc.
21 4
The case presents an unusual application of the Montgomery
206. Breckenridge, 127 N.L.R.B. at 1467 (Jenkins & Fanning, Members, dissenting).
207. 222 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1976), reversed in relevant part sub noma., Nazareth Regional
High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1977).
208. In reaching its conclusion the Board stated that inasmuch as the two employees in
question were supervisors, "we find that [the employer] thereby engaged in coercive con-
duct, interfering with employees' Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
That [the supervisor] was also a union member does not enable him to avoid the proscrip-
tions of the Act." 222 N.L.R.B. at 1054 (footnote omitted).
209. Id.
210. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363 (1978), modified per curiam,
628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Triumph Curing Center, 222 N.L.R.B. 627 (1976), enforced, 571
F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1978).
211. Triumph Curing Center v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 462, 471 (9th Cir. 1978).
212. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 235 N.L.R.B. 363, 364 (1978), modified per
curiam, 628 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
213. Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Zimmerman presiding, Member
Jenkins dissenting in material part.
214. 253 N.L.R.B. 524 (1980).
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Ward doctrine in that the supervisor whose decertification activi-
ties were in question was a replacement for a striking predecessor.
In analyzing his affiliations, the Board relied on precedent which
states that a strike replacement is presumed to support the union
as his bargaining representative.2 15 The Board applied the Mont-
gomery Ward two-prong test when analyzing the issue of employer
responsibility for decertification activities of the unit member su-
pervisor. In examining the employer's conduct to determine if it
constituted encouragement, authorization or ratification, the Board
looked to the standard set forth in Consolidated Rebuilders,
Inc. :216 whether the employer's conduct constituted more than
ministerial aid. 17 After applying the second prong of the Mont-
gomery Ward test, the Board found that "there was absolutely no
evidence that any employee reasonably believed [the supervisor]
was acting on behalf of management."2 8
The Times Herald decision is important for two reasons. First,
it reaffirms earlier case interpretation of Montgomery Ward that
the employee's belief as to the affiliation of the supervisor is crucial
in determining the employer's involvement in the decertification
process. Second, Times Herald has given the employer an interpre-
tation of what activities constitute encouragement, authorization
or ratification in this type of case: "more than ministerial aid" as
interpreted by the cases discussed above.21 9 The Times Herald de-
cision and Montgomery Ward have been cited in several recent
cases where the Board found that a supervisor unit member's
215. See id. at 524 n.2.
216. 171 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1968).
217. Times Herald, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. 524 (1980). In Times Herald, the strike replace-
ment asked a manager how the employees could end the yearlong strike. Although the man-
ager said he could not discuss such matters, he did describe the decertification process to
the supervisor replacement and furnished him with the telephone numbers of the Board's
regional office. The supervisor thereupon obtained a decertification petition from the Board,
solicited employee support and filed the petition with the regional office. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. However, Member Jenkins argued vigorously in a dissenting opinion that al-
though the employees might have regarded the predecessor supervisor as one of them, there
was no evidence that the replacement was so considered. Indeed, Jenkins argued that the
evidence of the replacement as a strikebreaker, statutory supervisor and circulator of an
antiunion petition "demonstrably identifies his interests as aligned with management rather
than with those of rank and fie employees." Id. at 525 n.7. In considering the employees'
perception of the replacement supervisor as one of them, it does seem questionable that the




decertification activities would not be attributable to
management.22
In summary, a decertification petition may be tainted by acts
of supervisors who are unit members or by acts of other employees
if the employer encouraged, authorized, or ratified those activities.
A decertification petition will likewise be tainted if the employer
acted in such a manner as to lead employees reasonably to believe
that the supervisor or employee was acting for and on behalf of
management.
VI. EFFECT OF FILING A DECERTIFICATION PETITION UPON THE
EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN
While an employer may have successfully charted his course
through the "do's and don'ts" of the decertification process up to
the time of the filing of a decertification petition, a difficult issue
lies ahead: whether the employer may cease bargaining with the
incumbent union over the terms of a new contract while a decer-
tification petition is pending. Until very recently the answer to this
issue was obscured by confficting Board and circuit court decisions.
Although the Board in its recent decision, Dresser Industries,
Inc., 2 1 appears to have resolved the issue decisively in favor of re-
quiring the employer to continue bargaining with the union, it is
instructive to review the history of this decision which overruled
longstanding Board precedent.
Pursuant to section 8(a)(5) of the Act,222 the employer is
bound to a continuing obligation to recognize and bargain with the
contracting union. This duty exists both before and during the ne-
gotiation of a collective agreement, throughout the administration
of the agreement, and upon expiration thereof unless the employer
believes the union has lost its majority status.223 The Board and
the courts have consistently held that the incumbent union enjoys
a rebuttable presumption that it represents a majority of the em-
ployees during the life of the collective agreement.224 This pre-
220. See, e.g., Arcadia Foods, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1981); Hydro Conduit Corp., 254
N.L.R.B. 433 (1981).
221. 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 15,274 (Sept. 30, 1982).
222. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
223. R. GORMAN, supra note 119, at 380, 381.
224. Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
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sumption continues beyond the expiration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement but may be rebutted by evidence that either the
union no longer enjoys majority support, or that the employer en-
tertains a reasonably based, good faith doubt concerning the
union's continued majority status.225 If the employer can establish
a good faith doubt based on objective considerations,226 it may re-
fuse to bargain with the union over the terms of a new contract
without violating section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 227 The Board currently
holds the view that if an employer has established a reasonably
based, good faith doubt of the union's majority status, the union's
actual majority status is irrelevant.228 However, an employer may
not refuse to bargain with the union if the employer's own unlaw-
225. In Terrell Mach. Co., the Board stated:
It is well settled that a certified union, upon expiration of the first year following
its certification, enjoys a rebuttable presumption that its majority representative
status continues. This presumption is designed to promote stability in collective-
bargaining relationships, without impairing the free choice of employees. Ac-
cordingly, once the presumption is shown to be operative, a prima facie case is
established that an employer is obligated to bargain and that its refusal to do so
would be unlawful. The prima facie case may be rebutted if the employer affirm-
atively establishes either (1) that at the time of the refusal the union in fact no
longer enjoyed majority representative status; or (2) that the employer's refusal
was predicated on a good-faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's
continued majority status. As to the second of those, i.e., "good-faith doubt,"
two prerequisites for sustaining the defense are that the asserted doubt must be
based on objective considerations and it must not have been advanced for the
purpose of gaining time in which to undermine the union. This second point
means, in effect, the assertion of doubt must be raised "in a context free of un-
fair labor practices."
Id. at 1480-81 (footnotes omitted).
226. The Board has held that none of the following alone provides an adequate basis
for good faith doubt as to majority status: decrease in the number of noncompulsory union
check-off authorizations, NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966); em-
ployee turnover, NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1969);
decline in union membership, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
However, the Board has held that collectively such reasons could establish a basis for good
faith doubt of the union's majority status. Ingress-Plastene, Inc., v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 542
(7th Cir. 1970). Furthermore, until recently, the Board held that the filing of a decertifica-
tion petition alone was sufficient grounds on which the employer might base his good faith
doubt concerning the union's continued majority status. See Telautograph Corp., 199
N.L.R.B. 892 (1972), overruled, Dresser Indus., Inc., 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) % 15,274 (Sept.
30, 1982). See also Krupman, Withdrawal of Recognition Based On Objective Evi-
dence-Reckoning By Starlight, 1 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 288 (1976) for an analysis of objective
evidence and its use in withdrawing recognition of a union.
227. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414
F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1969).
228. Arkay Packaging Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 397 (1976).
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ful acts229 contributed to the union's loss of majority support.230
Members of the Board2 31 and the courts 232 have been in disa-
greement as to the effect that the filing of a timely decertification
petition has on the employer's duty to continue bargaining with
the incumbent union. Since the filing of a decertification petition
for an election only requires a thirty percent showing of interest by
the employees,3 " it is not conclusive of the union's loss of majority
support. Some Board members have consistently argued that it
then should not be used as raising a genuine question concerning
representation on which an employer relies in discontinuing his
bargaining obligation. These Board members argue that the em-
ployer has a duty to continue bargaining until the union is in fact
decertified.2 34 Despite this irrefutable logic, a majority of the
229. See, e.g., Daisy's Originals, Inc. of Miami, 187 N.L.R.B. 251 (1970), enforced as
amended, 468 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1972); Freemont Newspapers, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 390
(1969), enforced as modified, 436 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1970); Boren Clay Prod. Co., 174
N.L.R.B. 895 (1969), enforced, 419 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1970).
230. In the often-cited case of Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), the
Board stated that "the majority issue must not have been raised by the employer in a con-
text of illegal antiunion activities... aimed at causing disaffection from the union or indi-
cating that in raising the majority issue the employer was merely seeking to gain time in
which to undermine the union." Id. at 673 (emphasis in original).
231. Members Fanning and Jenkins disagreed with the majority (Chairman Miller and
Members Kennedy and Penello) holding in Telautograph that a decertification petition
filed by employees is sufficient evidence of loss of majority support by the union so as to
allow the employer to cease bargaining until the question of representation is resolved. See
Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, concurring).
Former Chairman Van de Water disagreed with the Board's majority (Members Fanning,
Jenkins, Zimmerman and Hunter) holding in Dresser Industries which overruled Telauto-
graph. Dresser Indus., Inc., 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 15,274 (Sept. 30, 1982) (Van de Water,
Chairman, dissenting).
232. The Eighth Circuit is in accord with the majority of the Board. See Royal Type-
writer Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB,
494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974). The Second, Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits disagree
that the filing of a decertification petition is a sufficient basis on which the employer may
rely to cease bargaining with the union. Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486
(2d Cir. 1975); Rogers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 937 (1974); Allied Industrial Workers v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
233. Section 9(e)(1) of the Act provides:
Upon the filing with the Board by 30 per centum or more of the employees in a
bargaining unit covered by an agreement between their employer and a labor
organization made pursuant to section 8(a)(3), of a petition alleging they desire
that such authority be rescinded, the Board will take a secret ballot of the em-
ployees in such unit and certify the results thereof to such labor organization
and to the employee.
29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1976).
234. Members Fanning and Jenkins. See, e.g., Michigan Prod., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1143,
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Board235 held until September 1982 that the timely filing of a
decertification petition alone, in the absence of any employer un-
fair labor practices, could be used by the employer to evidence
good faith doubt of the union's majority status and therefore jus-
tify a refusal to bargain.23 6 Although the majority opinion in the
Dresser case makes it clear that an employer may not now base his
good faith doubt of the union's loss of majority support solely on
the fact of a decertification petition filing (and hence cease bar-
gaining with the incumbent), the Board had previously reversed
itself twice on this issue.3 It is therefore important to analyze the
history of this most recent decision in examining the import of the
Board's current stance on this issue as reflected in Dresser
Industries.
The progenitor for the line of cases which established the em-
ployer's right to refuse to bargain on a new contract once a decer-
tification petition had been filed was the 1972 Board decision in
Telautograph Corp.238 In Telautograph, the union and the em-
ployer had worked under a collective bargaining agreement for
many years. During the term of the then current agreement, an
employee filed a petition for decertification. After a hearing, the
regional director issued a decision in which he denied the union's
objection that its current contract barred the election. The union
had requested that the company meet with it to negotiate a new
contract; however, subsequent to the Decision and Direction of
Election, the company refused to meet with the union because of
the question concerning representation raised by the decertifica-
1143 n.6 (1978) (Fanning, Member, disavowing the ALJ's application of Telautograph);
Warehouse Mkt., Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 216, 217 n.3 (1975) (Fanning, Chairman & Jenkins,
Member, disavowing the use of Telautograph).
235. Chairman Miller and Members Kennedy and Penello. Although the composition of
the Board in Dresser had changed substantially since the Telautograph decision in 1972,
only Members Fanning and Jenkins disavowed Telautograph. With two recent changes in
Board appointees during the last two years, Fanning and Jenkins were able to overrule Tel-
autograph with the help of new Members Zimmerman and Hunter. Dresser Indus., Inc., 5
LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 15,274 (Sept. 30, 1982). Chairman Van de Water dissented vigorously.
236. Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).
237. See William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660 (1954) (the continued negotiation of
a contract after the filing of a representation petition was not a violation of § 8(a)(2)). But
see Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958) (employer may not bargain with the in-
cumbent union when an outside union had fied an election petition until one or the other
had been certified pursuant to Board election).
238. 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972).
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tion filing. The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice
charge alleging the company had refused to bargain with it in vio-
lation of section 8(a)(5), and that such conduct should block the
election which the regional director had directed be held. The trial
examiner, in holding that the company was entitled to rely on the
filing of the petition in refusing to negotiate with the union, em-
phasized certain special circumstances present in this case. First,
that the employer's refusal to bargain came after the representa-
tion hearing and after the regional director had already decided to
conduct an election to determine the union's representative sta-
tus.2 s3 This factor was considered conclusive of the issue whether a
question concerning representation did in fact exist. Second, and
key to subsequent concurring Board decisions, there was
no evidence, nor even claim, that the [employer] here had engaged in any
unfair labor practices or antiunion activity to render improper or in any way
taint the atmosphere for such election. It in no way assisted or participated
in the filing of the decertification petititon or otherwise sought to dissipate
the union's majority status.24
In pursuing this line of reasoning, the trial examiner distinguished
this case from Massey-Ferguson,241 a case often relied on for the
principle that a decertification petition, standing alone, does not
raise a real question concerning representation.24 2 In Massey-Fer-
guson, the claim of loss of majority support arose after the em-'
ployer had engaged in numerous unfair labor practices and after
the regional director had already dismissed the decertification peti-
tion. In Telautograph, on the other hand, the petition was still
pending and there were no other unfair labor practices. The trial
examiner emphasized these facts in his decision.243 A majority of
239. Id. at 893.
240. Id. at 894.
241. 184 N.L.R.B. 640 (1970).
242. For a discussion of Massey-Ferguson, see Bellace, supra note 6, at 680-82.
243. In his decision the trial examiner stated:
Accordingly, under the special circumstances in this case-including the Re-
gional Director's Decision and Direction of Election still outstanding at the time
of Respondent's alleged . . . refusal to bargain, the complete absence of any
evidence (or even claim) of Company misconduct tainting the atmosphere for a
Board-conducted election, and the continuing pendency of the Regional Direc-
tor's order for an election-I find that the question of the Union's representative
status can and should be determined by means of an election ordered by the
Regional Director.
199 N.L.R.B. at 894.
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the Board,2 4 however, expanded the trial examiner's rationale to
hold that a decertification petition itself, supported by an ade-
quate showing of interest,245 raised a question concerning represen-
tation on which the employer could rely in refusing to bargain with
the union.In stating its position on this issue, the Board paralleled
the situation to that of the employer's obligation to cease bargain-
ing with an incumbent union when a rival union files a petition for
election which raises a real question concerning representation:
In Shea Chemical Corp., 121 NLRB 1027 (1958), the Board established the
rule that when a real question concerning representation has been raised by
the filing of a petition by a rival union that "an employer may not go so far as
to bargain collectively with an incumbent (or any other) union until the ques-
tion concerning representation has been settled by the Board." The same rule
should be applied where a real question concerning representation has been
raised by the timely filing of a decertification petition. As in the case of a
petition filed by a rival union, the incumbent union may still continue to
administer its contract and process grievances, and the rule does not apply in
situations where, because of contract bar, certification year, inadequate show-
ing of interest, or any other established reason, the decertification petition
does not raise a real representation question.
We wish to clarify this matter, since a clear statement of that principle
may obviate the necessity for lengthy delays in the processing of properly
supported decertification petitions under like circumstances in the future.
Such processing need not be delayed by an 8(a)(5) charge, since such charge
could be promptly dismissed as nonmeritorious unless, of course, the charge
contains allegations that the Respondent has committed some act (other than
its mere refusal to bargain) which may be a proper basis for finding a viola-
tion of our Act.
2 4'
It was in fact the overruling of the Shea Chemical decision in 1982
which led to the demise of the Telautograph holding.
A series of cases following the Telautograph decision indicate
the dissension among Board members and established a split
among the circuit courts as to whether the filing of a decertifica-
tion petition alone was sufficient evidence of the union's loss of
majority support such that the employer should cease bargaining
244. Chairman Miller, Members Kennedy and Penello (Fanning & Jenkins, members,
concurring with the trial examiner's recommendation).
245. An adequate showing of interest is found to exist if thirty percent of the employ-
ees have either by petition or cards, requested an election by the Board. NLRB Rules and
Regulations and Statements of Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1982).
246. Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972). The overruling of Shea Chemical in
RCA Del Caribe, Inc., 262 .N.L.R.B. No. 116, 1981-82 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,103 (1982)
precipitated the overruling of Telautograph.
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with the incumbent union. The Board24l 7 in National Cash Register
Co., 248 applied Massey-Ferguson and held that where the em-
ployer's unlawful conduct contributed to the filing of the decertifi-
cation petition, the employer may not rely on the filing as evidence
of loss of majority support by the union to justify a refusal to bar-
gain.249 Subsequent to the unfair labor practice charge, but prior to
a decision by the regional director, the employees filed a timely
decertification petition. The regional director subsequently issued
a complaint based on the union's charge and dismissed the decer-
tification petitions pursuant to the Board's blocking charge rule. In
holding that the union had not lost its majority status, nor had the
employer supported his allegation of good faith doubt, the Board
stated that "the [employer] may not rely on the decertification pe-
titions it unlawfully inspired; nor may it invoke the filing of such
petitions as a defense under the Board's recent Telautograph
decision.
'250
Although National Cash Register may be distinguished from
Telautograph on the basis that in the former the employer had
committed other unfair labor practices, the Board still appeared to
retreat from the pronouncement in Telautograph. The Board held
that a decertification petition and the showing of interest attached
to it alone, without other objective evidence that employees who
wished to be represented by the union were in the minority, was
insufficient to justify the company's claim of a good faith doubt of
the union's majority status .2 1 The Board further adopted the ad-
247. Chairman Miller and Members Fanning, Jenkins and Penello.
248. 201 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1973), enforcement denied in material part, 494 F.2d 189 (8th
Cir. 1974).
249. National Cash Register Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1035 (1973). See supra notes 45-47
and accompaning text.
250. Id. National Cash Register Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1035 (1973).
251. Id. at 1041. See also Lammert Indus. 229 N.L.R.B. 895, 932 (1977) where a major-
ity of the Board adopted the ALJ's findings which stated in part- "[I]t is well established
that the mere filing of a decertification petition does not destroy the presumption that a
recognized union enjoys of continued majority status. Thus, the mere filing of the decertifi-
cation petition did not destroy that presumption." Id. at 932. The opinion of members
Penello and Walther cited Telautograph and dissented as follows:
[W]e would not adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain with the union since November
27, 1974. For on that very day, at a time when Respondent had not engaged in
any unfair labor practices, a decertification petition was filed with the Board
accompanied by a statement showing almost unanimous employee support which
raised a question concerning representation of those employees.
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ministrative law judge's statement that only if the petition had
been supported by an uncoercced majority of the employees in the
union would it "unquestionably have constituted a sound basis for
the Company's doubt of the Union's representative status. 252 The
Board still holds today that a decertification petition executed by a
majority of the employees does indeed raise a question concerning
representation on which an employer may rely to cease bargaining
with the incumbent.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 53 took issue with the Board's
findings and decision in National Cash Register concerning the in-
ference to be drawn from the decertification petitions filed by the
employees. The Eighth Circuit, citing Telautograph, held that the
filing of a decertification petition did raise a permissible inference
of loss of majority support and stated that "[t]hat fact alone would
justify an employer in declining to bargain further with the bar-
gaining representative pending disposition of the dpcertification re-
quest, provided the loss of majority status was not attributable to
the employer's own unfair practices."' ' The court further stated
that although the existence of an unfair labor practice prior to the
refusal to bargain "interjects an element of uncertainty" as to
whether the employer caused the possible loss of majority, if it can
be shown that the unfair labor practice did not "significantly con-
tribute" to the loss of status, the employer will not be subjected to
an obligation to bargain. 55 Contrary to the Board, the court found
that there was no substantial evidence to suggest that the unfair
labor practices of the employer induced the filing of the decertifi-
cation petition nor that the unfair labor practices contributed gen-
erally to the possible loss of majority status by the union. The
court flatly stated that "[s]ince the decertification petitions were
supported by a showing of interest by the requisite 30 percent of
employee signatures, [the employer] could properly base a good
faith doubt of majority status upon the filing of these decertifica-
tion petitions."256
Id. at 895-96.
252. National Cash Register Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1041 (1973), enforcement denied
in material part, 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1974). See also GAF Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 169 (1972).
253. 494 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1971).
254. Id. at 194 (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 195.
256. Id. at 192. The court actually based its decision on the entire record which also
included other evidence of the union's loss of majority support: decline in dues check-off
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Former Board disagreement over the effect of the filing of a
decertification petition on the employer's obligation to bargain was
further evidenced in a case decided shortly after Telautograph. In
Cantor Bros., Inc.,257 the administrative law judge, in examining
the employer's refusal to bargain with the incumbent union, found
that the employer had both failed to establish that it had based its
good faith doubt of majority status of the union on objective con-
siderations, and that it had engaged in a course of conduct to un-
dermine the union. The administrative law judge, relying on sev-
eral pre-Telautograph cases, emphatically stated that "the filing of
a decertification petition is insufficient to give an employer a basis
for withdrawing recognition. ' 25 8 Although the three member panel
of the Board259 adopted the recommended order, Members Ken-
nedy and Penello, citing Telautograph, specifically rejected the ad-
ministrative law judge's rationale insofar as it relied on the above
statement.260 Member Jenkins in a note to the opinion criticized
Members Kennedy and Penello for the exception they took to the
administrative law judge's recommendation.26 1
In Morse Electro Products Corp.,262 the next case decided by
the Board addressing this issue, a Board panel263 reaffirmed the
majority position stated in Telautograph. In Morse Electro, the
employer refused to bargain with the union subsequent to the ex-
piration of the collective agreement on the basis that the union
had lost its majority status. Although the employer in its brief
before the administrative law judge enumerated several reasons26
authorizations, high employee turnover, and decline in union membership. It is curious to
note that while the court acknowledged that none of these factors alone provided an ade-
quate basis for good faith doubt of the majority status of the union, the mere filing of a
decertification petition did. Id. at 193.
257. 203 N.L.R.B. 774 (1973).
258. Id. at 778.
259. Members Jenkins, Kennedy and Penello presiding.
260. Cantor Bros., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 774, 774 n.4 (1973).
261. Id.
262. 210 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1974).
263. Chairman Miller and Members Fanning and Penello.
264. The employer based its refusal to bargain on the following evidence of loss of ma-
jority support by the union:
1) Office employees voted by more than two to one against renewal of a union
shop agreement;
2) Following this election more than 70% of the office employees canceled
their dues authorizations and presumably resigned from the union;
3) An office employee filed a decertification petition and the employer was
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for its belief that the union no longer represented the employees,
the administrative law judge, citing Telautograph, and finding no
other unfair labor practices by the employer, based his decision
only on the fact that a decertification petition had been filed, stat-
ing: "It is the Board's view that an employer, once it learns its
employees have filed a Decertification Petition with the required
30 percent showing of interest, may properly decline to bargain
further with the bargaining representative pending disposition of
the decertification request." 265 Indeed, the Board went so far as to
hold that the employer who had not inspired or participated in any
way in the circulation and subsequent filing of the decertification
petition, had a right to grant a unilateral wage increase since it was
not acting in derogation of the union's majority status.26 Although
the wage increase and the employer's concurrent refusal to bargain
took place subsequent to the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement, it occurred prior to a determination by the regional di-
rector that a question of representation did exist.
The polarity of opinion among Board members as to the appli-
cation of Telautograph appeared in yet another case which was
decided by a Board panel of acting Chairman Fanning and Mem-
bers Jenkins and Penello. In Warehouse Market, Inc.,267 the Board
unanimously agreed that the employer had violated his bargaining
obligation to the union, despite the filing of a decertification peti-
tion, where there was evidence of unfair labor practices committed
by the employer before or shortly after the drafting and circulation
of the petition. However, in a footnote to the opinion, it was noted
that Fanning, Jenkins and Penello did not rely on Telautograph
which was cited in the Board's opinion.268 The Board affirmed the
administrative law judge's decision which stated:
advised that at least 50% of the office employees supported this action;
4) A substantial number of employees had voluntarily informed the employer





267. 216 N.L.R.B. 216 (1975).
268. Id. at 217 n.3. The Board's decision contains the following statement: "Cf. Telau-
tograph Corporation ...a case holding that only the filing of a decertification petition
which raises a genuine question concerning representation relieves an employer of his obli-
gation to bargain pending resolution of the representation issue." Id.
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Respondent's... contentions fly in the face of well-established Board and
Court-honored precedents which hold that: (1) we will not conduct a decer-
tification election where, as here, there are unremedied unfair labor practices
committed by an employer for the purpose of causing employee disaffection
from a validly established union bargaining representative; and (2) we will
presume that a validly established union representative continues to enjoy
majority support where, as here, its status is questioned by an employer's
refusal to bargain, unless the employer is able to prove that he relied on
valid, objective considerations in questioning the union's continued majority
support. Plainly, Respondent could not validly meet that employer burden by
reliance on the decertification petition's filing to support its claim of disaffec-
tion by a majority of the employees where, as here, the Respondent's unlaw-
ful conduct in large measure created or contributed to the situation which led
to such disaffection, and it submitted no evidence to support such a claim.
2 9
Confusingly, however, a Board panel270 later achieved unanim-
ity in a decision which totally encompassed the Board decision in
Telautograph. In Essex International, Inc.,27 1 Telautograph was
extended to apply to a situation where a decertification petition
had been dismissed before a hearing could be held to address a
union's complaint which alleged unfair labor practices and that the
employer refused to bargain.27 2 Despite the fact that the alleged
unfair labor practices were not sustained,27 3 the Board held that
the employer was justified in claiming that it had a reasonably
based, good faith doubt of the union's majority status given the
timely filing of a decertification petition by employees.
In a decision and several advice memoranda by the Board 27 4 in
the late 1970s, Telautograph was interpreted to allow an employer
the right to refrain from negotiating a new contract once a decer-
tification petition had been filed, but denied him the right to with-
draw recognition of the union. In a fact situation similar to Telau-
tograph, where there was no evidence that the employer had
instigated the decertification petition or committed any other un-
fair labor practices, the employer was found not to have violated
the Act by refusing to execute an agreement with the union, even
269. Id. at 17.
270. Chairman Murphy and Members Penello and Walther.
271. 222 N.L.R.B. 121 (1976).
272. Id. at 132.
273. Id.
274. See Michigan Prod., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1978). See also Advice Memoran-
dum, Napko Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 250 (1980); Advice Memorandum, Gates Rubber Co., 1980
NLRB (CCH) 20,254 (1980); Advice Memorandum, General Radiator Div. Chromalloy
Am. Corp., 1978-79 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 20,221 (1979).
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after the union had accepted the employer's offer, where the exis-
tence of a valid decertification petition raised a question concern-
ing representation.2 75 The opinion suggests that an employer's re-
fusal to execute a contract was permissible, based upon the filing
of the decertification petition. The decision in part stated:
It is well settled that an employer does not violate section 8(a)(5) of the Act
by refusing to bargain with an incumbent union during the pendency of a
valid decertification petition. This is not to say that the employer may go
further and completely withdraw recognition merely because an RD petition
has been filed. Such withdrawal requires a reasonable doubt of the Union's
presumed majority status based upon objective considerations showing a loss
of majority support. A valid RD petition, standing alone, only shows that
30% of the employees want a determination of a question of representation
through a Board election.
27 6
In reviewing the Board decisions leading up to the Dresser de-
cision, it is clear that Telautograph and its progeny set forth a
policy providing that the filing of a timely decertification petition,
supported by an adequate showing of interest, raised a real ques-
tion concerning representation. An employer, absent any unlawful
conduct, could lawfully decline to bargain over a new contract with
the incumbent union, unless and until that union won the decer-
tification election. Such policy required neither proof of loss of ma-
jority status nor evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of majority status. However, the Board at this point had also made
it clear that even where the decertification petition has been filed,
the employer must continue to recognize the union for purposes
other than bargaining over a new contract until the union is in fact
decertified. 7
Both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the District of
Columbia Circuit Court took issue with the majority of the Board's
ruling in Telautograph that the filing of a decertification petition
by employees is sufficient to establish a good faith and reasonably
grounded doubt of the union's continued majority status. In a re-
cent case278 prior to Dresser, in which the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court affirmed a Board order requiring an employer to bargain
275. Advice Memorandum, General Radiator Div. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 1978-79
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 20,221 (1979).
276. Id. (footnotes omitted).
277. Id.




with an incumbent union despite the pendency of a decertification
petition, the court quoted from a previous decision:
The naked showing that a decertification petition has been filed, with no in-
dication of the number of signatories or other related matters, is an insuffi-
cient basis in fact for refusing to bargain since it establishes no more than
that the petition was supported by the requisite 30 percent "showing of
interest."
217
The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts are in accord with this
opinion.280 In a footnote to its opinion, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court criticized the Eighth Circuit's per se rule that the
mere filing of a decertification petition, in the absence of employer
unfair labor practices, and without objective evidence of loss of
majority status, was sufficient grounds for an employer to refuse to
bargain with an incumbent union.28 1 Although the court referred to
only one Board member 282 as also entertaining this view, the Board
decisions examined herein suggest that a majority of the Board un-
til very recently still entertained this view.
In light of the split among Board members in opinion over
Telautograph as evidenced by the cases analyzed, and the varied
opinions of the circuit courts, it was with confusion that the em-
ployer confronted the issue of whether it must bargain and per-
haps execute an agreement with the incumbent union in the face of
a pending decertification election, or whether it must refrain from
any negotiations until the election results. Recognizing the contro-
versy in this area, the Board has attempted to resolve it with a
pronounced reversal of past policy rendered in two opinions last
year. The earlier decision, RCA Del Caribe, Inc.,2s3 affects the Tel-
autograph holding and its progeny. In this case the Board reas-
sessed its holding in Shea Chemical, Inc.,2 s4 and determined that
it had failed to accord appropriate weight to an incumbent union's
presumption of majority status in providing that the employer
should cease bargaining with the incumbent upon the filing of a
petition for election by a rival union. The Board further concluded
279. Id. (quoting Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
280. See, e.g., Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1975);
Rogers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937
(1974).
281. NLRB v. Maywood Plant of Grede Plastics, 628 F.2d 1, 4 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
282. Id. at n.3 (Member Penello).
283. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 1981-82 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,103 (1982).
284. 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958).
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that requiring an employer to cease bargaining with the incumbent
subsequent to the filing of a petition was not the best way to as-
sure employer neutrality, the true objective behind the cease-bar-
gaining requirement. Reversing its former position, the Board held
that "the mere filing of a prepresentation petition by an outside,
challenging union will no longer require or permit an employer to
withdraw from bargaining or executing a contract with an incum-
bent union."28 5 With the overruling of Shea Chemical, the ration-
ale for the Board's decision in Telautograph was destroyed, and it
was simply a matter of waiting for the appropriate case to come
along for the Board to overrule Telautograph. On September 30,
1982, the Board286 heard Dresser Industries, Inc.287 and resolved
with its decision the confusion and conflict which had been gener-
ated by the Telautograph ruling. The Board pronounced its new
policy by stating:
[T]he same considerations which led to our overruling of the Shea Chemical
rule also mandate overruling the Telautograph rule. A rule permitting an em-
ployer to withdraw from bargaining solely because a decertification petition
has been filed does not give due weight to the incumbent union's continuing
presumption of majority status and is not the best way to achieve employer
neutrality in the election. For these reasons, we hold that the mere filing of a
decertification petition will no longer require or permit an employer to with-
draw from bargaining or executing a contract with an incumbent union.288
The Board emphasized in a footnote to its decision, however,
that an employer may still withdraw from bargaining with an in-
cumbent union once a decertification petition has been filed on the
basis of objective evidence of loss of majority support. A petition
signed by a majority of the unit employees represents such objec-
tive evidence.289 Short of execution of a decertification petition by
a majority of employees, the Board now holds that an employer
must bargain with the incumbent union and enter into a contract
with that union even though a decertification election is pending.
285. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 1981-82 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 19,103 (1982).
286. Members Fanning, Jenkins, Zimmerman and Hunter concurring;, Chairman Van de
Water dissenting.
287. Dresser Indus., Inc., 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) % 15,274 (Sept. 30, 1982).
288. Id.




Despite the necessity for Board refinement of standards for
employer participation at certain stages of the decertification pro-
cess,290 current Board decisions are clear that employers may par-
ticipate to a significant extent in the decertification process. There
is an obvious progression in the degree of participation an em-
ployer is allowed by the Board from the initiation of a petition
through the pre-election stage. At the earliest stage, initiation of
the petition, the employer is forbidden to participate at all.2 1 At
the next stage, preparation, circulation and execution of the peti-
tion, it may only render ministerial assistance.292 What is meant by
"ministerial" assistance at this stage is not clearly defined. It is,
however, clear that the Board frowns on employer involvement be-
yond a response to questions, 2 3 or the giving of information, such
as a list of employees' names and addresses 294 which the employees
would not have access to on their own. At this stage an employer
may, in response to a question, clearly direct the employees to the
NLRB regional office. An employer would be ill-advised, however,
to offer assistance such as the telephone number and address of
the Board, or volunteer to call them on behalf of the employees.
While the Board allows the employer to render ministerial assis-
tance, the Board has also made clear that it will set aside a decer-
tification petition if the employer lent to it the appearance of ap-
proval.29 What constitutes the appearance of approval is
ambiguous.2 96 An employer, under current Board law, would there-
fore be ill-advised to render assistance beyond that mentioned
above.
Once the decertification process reaches the pre-election stage,
the degree of allowable employer involvement is greater. So long as
the employer does not violate the Act by threats, reprisal, or
promises of benefit for decertifying the union, it may openly com-
290. This is particularly true at the preparation, circulation and petition stage, but the
limitation on assistance other than ministerial aid is also enforced at the stage when the
decertification petition has been filed and the employer is confronted with the decision
whether to continue bargaining.
291. Allou Distrib., Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 47 (1973).
292. Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1968).
293. KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1967).
294. Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1968).




pare the union employee benefits with those of non-union
employees.
297
At each of these stages the petition is subject to possible
"taint" by the acts of the employer's supervisors who are union
members or other employer-agents. The taint exists if the em-
ployer, by word or deed, encouraged, authorized or ratified the em-
ployee-agent activities or acted in such a manner to lead employees
reasonably to believe that the card-carrying supervisor or employee
was acting on behalf of management.2 98 The Board decisions in
this area quite clearly delineate circumstances under which the
employee's activities will be attributed to the employer.299
Finally, once the petition has been filed, the employer must,
according to current Board law,300 continue bargaining with the in-
cumbent union and execute a contract if agreement is reached even
though a decertification election is pending. If the incumbent
union loses the election, then the contract is void and the employer
must engage in negotiations with the newly elected representative.
While Board law does define employer participation at each of
the above-discussed stages of the decertification process, these def-
initions vary in clarity. It is therefore impossible for an employer
to be completely aware of the limits of its participation. It is hoped
that this Article has served to clarify for employers the extent and
degree to which they may participate in the decertification process
without violating any of their obligations under the Act.
297. Dow Chem. Co., 250 N.L.R.B. 756 (1980).
298. Times-Herald Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 524 (1980).
299. See supra notes 141-220 and accompanying text.
300. Dresser Indus. Inc., LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 15,274 (Sept. 30, 1982).
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